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ABSTRACT 
Hendershot, Margaret E., M.A., Spring 1981 History 
The Taiping Rebellion and Sino-British Relations, 1850-1864 
(122 pp.) 
Director: Robert R. Dozier 
This work is an analysis of the Taiping Rebellion's influence 
upon the formation of British policy toward the Imperial govern­
ment of China, 1850 to 1864. Documentation for the work consists 
primarily of the British Foreign Office correspondence on China. 
The Taiping Rebellion largely, but not exclusively, determined 
British attitudes and conduct toward the Imperial authorities. 
The circumstances which led to the change in China's foreign 
policy in turn influenced the British response to the Chinese 
government. The alteration of Sino-British relations that 
resulted from the Taiping Rebellion exemplified "informal" Brit­
ish imperialism, and perfectly fitted Britain's Free Trade 
interests. 
ii 
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IKTRO'DUGTION 
In the nineteenth centuryt the power of the enfeebled Ch'ing 
dynasty continued to decline. The government failed to resolve the 
social, economic, and political problems which arose during a century of 
rapid change, Western trading nations brought goods, ideas, laws, and 
technology disturbing to the Middle Kingdom, which worsened China's 
internal disruption. Amidst the confusion of change? the Taiping rebels 
instigated a civil war. The coincidence of the Taiping Rebellion and 
the growth of foreign influence in China indicated the exhaustion of 
the Ch'ing government, and .led to the breakdown of the Confucian polity. 
Dynasties of China, frequently came to power through conquest; the 
Ch'ing were Kanchus, a racial minority Kfao conquered China in 1644. To 
rule China the government required a large retinue cf bureaucrats to 
assist in administration. Alth.ough Kan Chinese considered the Manchus 
an alien or "barbarian" dynasty, they served the Giving government, 'Hie 
Manchus instituted many discriminatory practices which made them obnox­
ious to their subjects. The Manchu-style queue worn by all males was 
only one syvfool of Chinese servitude. The governmental "hierarchy 
consisted of Manchu princes, noblemen and. bannermen, all of whom were a 
charge on public funds. . , . Imperial clansmen could only be tided by 
their peers; Manchus in general could only be tried by Manchus. . . . 
There were separate codes of law for different races. . .. .Trie 
Manchus also systematically rotated district officials to guard against 
J. 
2 
A 
disruptive localism, While the Manchus attempted to utilize Chinese 
institutions, their exclusive and authoritarian policies proved divisive,, 
The Chinese economy was agrarian* By the nineteenth century, the 
•population had increased enormously. 'The amount of land under culti­
vation was not proportionately expanded and the government's policies 
intensified the problems of the peasantry. Estates were consolidated 
3 at the expense of tenants and hired laborers," while the unequal burden 
4 
of taxation fell increasingly on the poor. The government debased 
copper coinage,"' Opium imports expanded rapidly; the drug was purchased 
in silver,, causing a drain of the metal and an increase in its value. 
The s3.lvex* shortage made it difficult for officials to collect the land 
tax, and oroated hardship for the peasants who purchased silver with 
debased copper, As the covjrt sold political offices, corruption spread 
among government officials, resulting in a decrease in the amount ox 
revenue sent to the Imperial treasury.^ Court expenditures increased, 
but not TO relieve the peasantry. "The Chinese peasant was also the 
victim of a series of natural calamities so devastating as to leave no 
doubt- in the minds of the superstitious that the Heavenly mandate of 
7 the Ch'ing dynasty had been completely exhausted." 
The government's oppressive economic and political policies led 
"Lc social unrest. Banditry was rife, necessitating formation of local 
militia,. In the heavily-taxed southern provinces of Kwangsi and Kwang-
tungs, the unassimilated HakJca. minority battled the Punt.i, or local 
people., over unused land. In Kwangsi, disorder was so serious that the 
8 
Punti used militia against the Hakfcas,, Military decentralisation 
"made central military financing more and. more difficult, As autarchy 
3 
spread, local resources became available only for local use; and so it 
9 grew difficult to send official troops from one province to another," 
Khile local revolts flourished and secret societies re-emerged, the 
central government's policies became increasingly irrelevant to Chinese 
society. 
The presence of Europeans in China added, to the problems of the 
Ch'iiig government. In the nineteenth century, the Chinese found it 
necessary to formulate a coherent policy that accomodated the European 
"barbarians" who came to trade. The Ch'ing dynasty adopted the tradi­
tional Chinese method of managing barbarians. As they assumed their 
culture was superior, the Chinese thought that barbarians must follow 
the emperor's irresistable moral suasion. Through the rite of "tribute" 
or gifts to the emperor, the Chinese established their superiority and 
10 
Initiated barbarians into their culture. The tribute system func­
tioned as a form of commerce and reinforced the government's prestige; 
trade and tribute fused into a system of foreign relations. "The 
important thing to the rulers of China was the moral value of tribute. 
The important thing for the barbarians was the material value of trade. 
The. rub came when the foreign trade expanded, and finally . . . eclipsed 
li 
tribute entirely, without changing the official myth." x As they 
sought to bring- China into modernity to advance their trade interests, 
I 
Europeans rejected the Sinocentric world-view. The assertion of Western 
trade principles, however, did not automatically lead to a change in 
China's foreign policy. Entrenched in their traditional attitudes, the 
Chinese long resisted Westernization. 
The Chinese initially limited trade to the "factories" at Canton. 
As the illegal opium traffic expanded, arid the attendant disorder became 
unmanageable9 the system collapsed. "All the latent issues of diplo­
matic equality, commercial freedom, bad delxt-s, legal jurisdiction, and 
Sino-foreign friction generally, combined in the late 18.30's to poison 
the once genial atmosphere of Canton and. create an explosive situa-
tion."'~ The "breakdown of the Canton system strongly affected Great 
Britain, the most influential trading nation. In the Opium War (1PA0--
1842), the Chinese and the British redressed mutual grievances. De­
feated,. the Ch'ing government settled on a policy of appeasement. In 
1842, the Treaty of Naming was signed., "by which the Chinese ceded Hong 
Kong to the British and five treaty ports, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, 
Canton, and Shanghai were opened to trade. In 1843, the British Treaty 
of the Bogue was signed, which contained clauses for the most-favored-
nation status (Article VIII) and extraterritorality (Article IX). 
Through most-favored-nation status, the British, would receive any 
privilege accorded to another treaty power, while extraterritorality 
granted British officials jurisdiction over British subjects in China. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, treaties facilitated expansion of 
the China trade. "Versed neither in economics nor in Western law, the 
13 
Manchu administration hardly realized what it gave away." 
The Imperial government lost much of its prestige and authority 
through the unequal treaties. While Western law was forced upon it, 
the treaty "provisions, by and large, were compromises. British desire 
14 
had to be modified in the course of being realized." The English 
introduced Western law In China 'to promote regular commerce, but the 
treaties did not resolve the problem of opium. Although the British 
5 
sought to regularize the opium trade through legalisation, they were 
thwarted by the emperor's ban on the drug and strong vested interests 
in the contraband drug trade. "The result was to split the foreign 
trade of China into two parts, legal and illegal. Two sets of foreign 
communities, two channels for trade, two codes of conduct, grew up as a 
15 consequence." The coasting trade expanded, and along with it, piracy. 
Illegal opium continued to balance the trade between Britain and China,, 
The expected boom in English exported goods did not occur as China was 
self--.sufficient. Chinese exports of tea and silk, however, rapidly 
expanded. Shanghai and Amoy "became important commercial cities from 
their proximity to the tea and. silk producing districts, eclipsing 
Canton as a center of trade. Despite British intentions, commercial 
expansion proceeded haphazardly. "The real hinderances to trade were 
not the statutory transit taxes but the officials who used them as an 
excuse for their private exactions. The organized corruption of the 
Chinese fiscal system applied to foreign imports as much as to the land 
l6 
tax or other aspects of Internal economy*" Regularizatlon of trade 
through treaties and the expansion of British economic interests was 
impossible unless the Chinese responded to Western codes of conduct and 
law. 
At mid-nineteenth century, the British considered the doctrines 
of Free Trade inviolable. Interference with the market was shunned, 
except to protect trade and maintain free competition. In 1834, the 
Hast India Company's monopoly in China ended, and through the treaties 
that followed the Opium War, the British gradually established the 
principles of Free Trade. "The Free Trade commercial treaty . , . 
consisted ideally of only one clause—'the most-favoured-nation* clause. 
The object of the Mercantilist Treaty was to create and sustain monopo­
lies; the object of a Free Trade Treaty was to throw open world, trade 
17 for the benefit of all." Regardless of the lofty indifference the 
Chinese displayed, toward commerce, Victorians considered opening China 
to trade a boon to Chinese civilization and. the foreign trading nations. 
Free Trade provided more than material benefits. "The Fxee-trade 
principle ..." Richard Cobden asserted, "shall act on the moral world 
as the principle of gravitation in the universe,—drawing men together, 
thrusting aside the antagonism of race, and creed., and language, and 
18 
uniting us in the bonds of eternal peace/' 
Yet the foremost considerations of British officials were "the 
national political interest and the fair and equal treatment of British 
IP 
trade and. finance overseas." ' Commercial treaties, rather than fo.ee e, 
were the usual means of extending British .interests in foreign nations. 
An individual trader protected his own interests in fair competition 
ensured by treaty. The British government generally adhered to a course 
of non-intervention in the internal, affairs of foreign, nations or in 
the interests of private individuals. Government officials, however, 
"accepted that wars for trading opportunities might constitute a justi­
fiable use of public resources provided they were in the interest _pf 
% 
the nation as a whole . . . and that at least some notional diplomatic 
justification based on abuse of treaty rights or international law 
20 
could, be put forward." British officials sought to extend trade, not 
authority, in foreign nations. They adopted, a. course of intervention 
with great reluctance. 
? 
The British hesitated to intervene in the affairs of China. They 
feared "another India." To "begin by trading with China and to end by 
governing 'was expensive,, problematic, and therefore undesirable. 
"'Another India' would have "been superfluous; all thai could be achieved 
on behalf of expansion of trade by some political dominion in the east 
was in fact being achieved by India. There was no strategic reason for 
taking territory in China. China was not on the route to anywhere.""' 
The China market, though considered potentially fabulous by the "Old 
China Hands," did not justify large-scale terrj.tor.ial control to secure 
it. China's size would have made it difficult for the British to exert 
uniform control in the interior. Great Britain's commercial and naval 
supremacy made her confident of maintaining 'trade relationships. "Her 
leading position as a manufacturing nation and in the carrying trade, 
and not least her system of financial credit, made Free Trade especially 
convenient to her, and colonial markets and sources of supply, in the 
22 „ 
formal sense, almost totally unnecessary." ' Expansion of Free Trade, 
rather than a desire for territorial aggrandizement or political control 
guided British policy toward China. 
By 1850, irregular! ti.es in the China trade again irritated the 
British. Foreign Secretary Palmerston abandoned responsibility for 
23 
enforcing the tariff stipulated in' the treaty, • and adopted, a swag­
gering attitude. "The time is fast coming when we shall be obliged to 
strike another blow in China ..." he wrote. "These half civilized 
Governments . , . require a Dressing every eight or ten years to keep 
them in order. Their minds are too sl.1all.0w to receive an jjnpression 
that will last longer than some such period and warning is of little 
use,"'"4 Lord Palmerston left the Foreign Office in late 1851 , however, 
and his successors followed a more cautious policy. In 1853» the 
Taiping rebels' advance into the rich Yangtze valley added a new compli­
cation to Sino-British relations; the problem of British policy toward 
the Taiping Rebellion. 
In 183?{ Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, the future Taiping leader, experienced 
visions during a mental illness that followed his third failure to pass 
the Confucian-style civil service examination. Hung came from a poor 
family of Hakkas who resided near Canton. In his village, "he was 
regarded as a future scholar-official certain to repay all those who 
made /economic/ sacrifices to help him attain office."' Upon recov­
ering from his illness, Hung became the village school teacher, but in 
1843, he again failed his government examination., In the same year he 
read a religious tract, Good Words to Admonish the Age, and interpreted 
his earlier visions in a Christian context. Hung converted to Chris­
tianity and began to preach his new faith. His reading cf the Christian 
tracts was highly personalized. "Many passages he took to be a direct 
call to himself in particular* Similarly, he believed that the Heavenly 
Kingdom and God's chosen race were China and the Chinese, and he later 
appropriated the former term for the name of his own revolutionary 
state. 
Hung converted his cousin, Hung Jen-kan, and a friend. Feng Yun-
shan. Feng organized the God-worshipping Society on Thistle Mountian, 
out of which grew the Taipings, Hung became an iconoclastic itinerant 
preacher. In 1847, after an American missionary refused to baptize him, 
ha joined the God-worshippers on Thistle Mountain, Hung encouraged 
9 
iconoclasm among the God-worshippers. While the sect gained followers, 
27 
its actions enraged the local population. Hung left the group for 
several months "but returned in 1849. He and Feng gathered leaders 
among the God-worshippers, who later commanded the Taipings, Adherents 
of the God-worshipping Society mainly were from the poorer classes. 
HaMca farmers, charcoal workers, smugglers- bandits, secret society 
members, army deserters, convoy guards, and a number of followers from 
78 
aboriginal tribes joined the God-worshippers.~ The shift of trade to 
Shanghai created an economic crisis around Canton; the resulting distress 
and discontent induced many to join the God-worshipping Society. Hunan 
and- Xiangsi provinces, "full of unemployed boatmen and coolies; and the 
Yangtze valley, with its impoverished peasants and 'propertyless vaga­
bonds,"' were areas in which the God-worshippers attracted large 
followings. 
Membership of the God-worshipping Society rapidly increased as 
Hakkas joined the sect for protection a,gainst the Punti. "In the 
villages where they predominated, the Hakka congregations took over 
local control and forced others to join. The conflict between Hakka 
and non-Hakka was thus transformed into one between the God Worshippers 
30 
Society and opposing militant organizations." To fight the Punti who 
organized militia and received government military assistance, the God-
worshippers formed military camps, manufactured weapons, and established 
31 
a common treasury of goods. "Two parties emerged: one consisted of 
the militia, gentry, and government; the other of the God-worshippers 
and the oppressed Hakkas and outlaws."^ In late 1850, the chronic 
battles between the Hakka and Punti in Kwangsi province grew to 
10 
unmanageable proportions, beginning the Taiping Rebellion, In 1851, 
Hung Hsiu-ch'uan founded the T'ai-p'ing T*ien~kuo ("Heavenly Kingdom of 
Great Peace") as a new dynasty of China. 
Hie Taiping military government was consolidated under Hung Hsiu-
ch'uan- the T'ien Wang or Heavenly King. Hung appointed five other 
wangs or kingss Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, the Eastern Zing and Taiping Prime 
Ministerj Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei, the Western King? Feng Yun-shan, the 
Southern King; Wei Ch'ang-hui, the Northern King; and Shih Ta-k'ai, the 
OO 
Assistant King. As second, in command, the Eastern King controlled the 
other four kings, By allowing their hair to grow long and refusing to 
shave their foreheads, the Taipings defied Manchu tradition. They used 
religious dogma to discipline their army. "The Ten Commandments, bap­
tism. the keeping of the Sabbath were believed in, practiced, and 
ruthlessly enforced. , . . The Biblical component was an effective 
instrument of mass control and an important factor in Taiping military 
3*4 
success. To rally the Chinese to their cause, the Taipings issued 
declarations against the Manchus in which they frequently referred to 
the Manchus' ethnicity.̂  Early in the rebellion the Western and 
Southern Kings were killed; however, the incompetence of the Manchu 
forces and the rebels' strategy, ideology» organization, and discipline 
36 
enabled them successfully to march north; steadily gaining followers. 
By 1853i the Taipings controlled several provinces and had established 
Nanking as their capital city. 
Western historians generally agree that the Taiping Rebellion 
failed from its internal contradictions. The Taipings' Hakka origins, 
their battles with the local Punti, the Chinese and the Hakkas' 
resentment 'toward the alien Manchus all contributed to the tangled 
ethnicity of the Taiping movement. The Taipings practiced an unorthod 
form of Christianity; their religion and iconoclasm offended Chinese 
entrenched in Eastern beliefs, particularly the scholar-gentry Imbued 
37 with Confucianism.* Western observers were repelled, by the Taipings' 
38 
modification of Christianity, which nevertheless contributed to the 
39 movement' s politicissation. Taiping Christianity was too Christian t 
enable the rebels to attract leaders from the scholar-gentry, but 
inadequately politicized for them to win enough followers among the 
4o 
ostensibly anti-Manchu Chinese. tfhile the Taipings formulated a 
system of communal goods in a "sacred treasury" and advocated land 
redistribution upon communistic principles, their land reforms largely 
remained unimplemented. The Taipings gave precedence to warfare, and 
the peasants were hostile to a revolutionary economi.c system that did 
not satisfy their desire for private land ownership. The rebels 
lacked supporters among the scholar-gentry and much of the peasantry,, 
yet they represented the most formidable challenge to Chinese civili­
sation in the nineteenth century. 
Neither the Chinese nor the Western trading nations passively 
awaited the interne),! collapse of the Taiping Rebellion, which caused 
havoc throughout most of China, disrupted trade, and threatened Wester 
interests. The Imperial government's green-banner army was utterly 
demoralised and corrupt. The Imperial forces largely consisted of 
local military units under gentry leaders such as Tseng Kuo-fan, who 
defended the Confucian polity, and incidently the Manchu dynasty, 
h? 
against the Taipings. The Imperial forces, however, received direct 
military aid. and training from the British, as well as indirect 
financial assistance from the Maritime Customs system under British 
supervisiont 
Historians continue to debate the cynicism of British intervention 
in the rebellion. They regard the war~indemniti.es owed by the Manchus 
hj 
to the British government, the treaty provision for opening the 
Yangtze River after the rebels' defeat, and the Manchus' permissive­
ness in the opium trade (as opposed to the Taipings* stance against the 
\ 4r-; 
drug) as primary motives for British support of the Manchus. While 
the British had established diplomatic ties tc the Imperial government, 
they followed a cautious, reluctant, and inconsistent course toward, 
intervention. British policy was neither rigidly pro-dynastic nor a 
deliberate attempt to weaken the debilitated ImTjerial government. His­
torians vaunt and di.spara.ge the importance of foreign intervention in 
•̂6 
the Taiping Rebellion, but the internal failings of the movement 
played a significant role in the rebels' defeat. 
The Taipings* warfare, foreign policy, pseudo-Christian govern­
ment, and trade policy demonstrated to the English that their interests 
conflicted with the Free Trade interests of Great Britain. The rebels* 
policies and conduct, however, did not induce the British automatically 
to support tho dynasty, After the dissolution of the East India 
Company's monopoly, British authorities continually experienced problems 
with the Imperial government. Throughout the Taiping Rebellion they 
exerted diplomatic pressure, and ultimately force, to exact the Manchus* 
compliance with the Nanking Treaty. While the British eventually 
suj>ported the Imperial government, the Taiping Rebellion was not the 
13 
exclusive cause of the subsequent Sino-British alliance. The Manchus' 
adaptation to Western modes of diplomacy and trade principles signifi­
cantly improved their relations with the British. Sino-British. 
cooperation gradually developed from events and diplomacy inf.lue.nced 
largely, 'but not exclusively, by the Taiping Re"bel3.ion. 
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CHAPTER I 
REBELLION AND DIPLOMACY 1850-4855 
Through rebellion in China, the British gradually became, involved 
with upholding the Imperial government's sovereignty to protect their 
commercial interests. Free Trade required political stability, which 
the rebellions undermined. Although the British avoided assuming 
political authority in China, preservation of their economic interests 
necessitated cooperation with the central government to further their 
common interest, stability. Problems of treaty implementation and. 
revision, as well as the British policy of neutrality in the civil war 
prevented corcplet<? Sino-British cooperation. In the early 1850* s a 
tenuous Sino~British cooperation slowly developed from the circumstances 
of rebellion. 
At mid-century, rebellions flourished in China, threatening the 
authority of the Manchu dynasty. While the Small Sword Society, an 
offshoot of the Triads, sought to re-establish the Ming dynasty, the 
Red Turbans disturbed the area around Canton. The Taipings constituted 
the greatest rebel force in China, They eventually controlled, large 
provincial areas and captured more than six hundred cities. The various 
rebel groups seldom cooperaxed; their divergent aims kept -them asunder. 
While the government's decrepit green-banner army faltered against the 
rebels, the local forces of the gentry were disunited until 1853* when 
Tseng Kua-fan began to marshal them under his leadership, 
17 
Before 1853? the British ignored the rebellions developing in 
China. The Superintendent of Trade in China, Sir George Bonham, assured 
Foreign Secretary Palmerston that "there has never been adequate ground 
for investing their incursions with the title of insurrection. No 
person of respectability has joined them, and it is the habit of such 
marauders ... to endeavour to lure the disaffected to their side by 
1 the assumption of rank, display of badges and similar artifices." 
Bonham foresaw, however, that the unsettling effect of rebellion around 
2 
Canton would depress British trade. While the rebels remained a minor 
threat to British interests, officials concentrated upon improving trade 
relations with the Imperial government. 
In the early 1850!sf the British were concerned with implementing 
the Nanking and Bogue treaties. Bonham complained that "a greater 
degree of rigor has been exercised at the Ports for the purpose of 
curtailing to the narrowest, limits the advantages gained by the 
3 Treaty. , . While Illegal opium traffic and piracy remained 
problematic3 the treaty system verged on collapse as traders evaded 
payment of tea and silk duties. Disgusted with the corrupt Chinese 
customs system, Palmerston abandoned efforts to combat smuggling, but 
his reaction was temporary. The British regarded legally-enforced 
trade as axiomatic and continued diplomatic pressure to remove irregu­
larities from the China trade. 'Hie Imperial administration obstinately 
refused to Westernize its diplomatic Intercourse, which meant recognizing 
"barbarian envoys as equals. While the British considered direct 
diplomatic relations with Peking a sine qua non to regular trade, the 
Chinese studiously avoided this humiliation by dissembling and delay. 
The "Canton city question" continued to irritate the British, as the 
Cantonese refused to open the city to foreigners. "Those responsible 
for the conduct of English affairs in China set up, as an article of 
faith, the dogma that the 'right of entry* was the keynote of success 
in Chinese affairs.""' Mter Palmerston' s unfulfilled threat of force, 
Foreign Office policy became quiescent and official attention to the 
treaties was diverted to the Chinese civil war. 
In 1853» the success of the Taiping and Triad rebellions made the 
English uneasy. Although the British knew little of the rebels' move­
ments and purposes, Bonham conjectured that the Manchus might request 
assistance from the British naval forces to intimidate the Taipings at 
Nanking.̂  He requested "to be informed of the views of Her Majesty's 
Government in regard to the whole of this question—and particularly to 
•? 
what extent, if assistance were given, it should be granted."' Bonham 
assured the Foreign Secretary that he would not render aid to the Manchu 
8 
unless the British obtained advantages in trade.' Intervention tempo­
rarily appeared expedient. Consul Alcock at Shanghai warned Bonham that 
unless the Imperial government received foreign assistance, its downfall 
o 
was imminent.' Bonham decided to confer with the rebels at Nanking. 
His observations and decisions formed the basis of British policy toward 
the Taiping .Rebellion. 
While he obtained preliminary knowledge of the Taipings' religion, 
government, and military strength, Bonham observed the political element 
of their Christianity. 
They have established a new religion, which may be called a kind of 
spurious revelation. The base of this structure is supposed to be 
founded upon the Old Testament and religious tracts; but they have 
• superadded thereto a tissue of superstition and. ncnsense which makes 
an unprejudiced party almost doubt whether it is not used merely as 
a political engine of power by "the Chiefs to sway thê ginds of 
those whom they are anxious to attach to their cause.'*" 
Bonham was not wholly cynical about the rebels' faith, but emphasised 
the political motives of the Taiping kings in using religious dogma to 
control their forces. He described the Taipings' puritanical discipline 
"The whole army pray regularly before meals. They punish rape, adul­
tery, and opium smoking with death. . . . The women captured in battle 
are lodged in separate buildings, as well as the children, who are at 
the same tame clothed and educated." Bonham explained the Taiping 
hierarchy of kings and ministers, and estimated their force to be less 
12 
than 25,000 fighting men. Upon meeting with the Taipings, Bonham 
inaugurated the policy of British neutrality,. 
Bonham cautioned the Taiping kings that interference with British 
13 
persons or property would invite retaliation. • To enforce neutrality, 
he forbade British subjects to engage in the civil war. His proclama­
tion, however, was a tacit admission that some English had entered the 
1̂  
war on an individual basis. Problems of maintaining neutrality 
multiplied as the rebellion continued. 
Although neutral in the civil war, the British speculated about 
trade relations with the Taipings, In June, 1853» the Taipings ad­
dressed an open letter to the English in which they alluded to the 
difficulties of trade. 
"While we; on our parts, do not prohibit commercial intercourse, we 
merely observe that . . « the going to and fro is accompanied with 
inconvenience; and. , . . we would deem it better to wait̂ a few 
months, until we have thoroughly destroyed the Tartars /the Manchus7 
when, perhaps, the subjects of your honourable nation could go an#-
come without being involved in the tricks of these false Tartars.± 
The-Taipings' overture met with Bonham's approval. He observed to 
21 
Foreign Secretary Clarendon that "more Political and Commercial advan­
tages are likely to he obtained from the Insurrectionists. , , . 
Although the Taipings were inexperienced traders, Bonham considered them 
more favorable to foreigners than the Imperialists, who were "proud, 
17 
overbearing, and inimical to an extension of Foreign Intercourse." 
The central government's policies toward trs.de irritated the British, 
but they abstained from aiding the Taipings to overthrow the Manchus as 
a means of furthering their commercial interests. 
The rebellion's adverse effect on trade at Shanghai negated the 
Taipings' diplomatic gestures, Bonham reported that "trade is in a 
languid condition. Imports of British goods at Sharghae /sic/ are 
unsaleable, while at Canton they are forced off at some 20 or 30 per 
cent lower rates than a few months back, . . . Prices /of tea/ at 
present rule from 30 to 35 psr cent higher than they were last year, 
-t g 
while its quality is said to be inferior.11"1' As the Chinese hoarded 
Carolus dollars and British goods remained unsold, a currency shortage 
developed, which necessitated large bullion imports. The currency 
problem was so great that even the opium traffic operated on a barter 
1 9 system. As British merchants found it difficult to pay the duties on 
their gocds, Consul Alcock withheld duties for a short time, violating 
the Nankitig Treaty. Bonham, however, strictly interpreted British 
legal obligations. He would, not permit merchants to defer payment of 
20 
duties without Chinese consent, which Alcock could not obtain. Trade 
with the Manchus involved considerable difficulty, yet the British were 
committed to the Imperial government through the treaties. 
In August, 1853) Bonham and the French representative in China, 
H. de Bourboulon agreed upon a policy of cooperation. In accordance 
with Clarendon's policy, Bonham informed the French minister that the 
British intended to maintain neutrality while negotiating for a Free 
Trade treaty. He assured BourboUlon that "Her Majesty's Government seek 
no exclusive privileges for the British Trade in China, "but that what­
ever' commercial advantages they may < . . obtain . . . they are , . . 
anxious . . . to share with all the civilized nations of the 
world. ..." Extension of British Free Trade interests did not 
entail British paramountcy. The most-favored-nation clause ensured the 
other treaty powers fair competition in the China market. Although the 
French minister slightly favored the Imperial cause, """ the British 
reiterated their policy of neutrality and Free Trade. 
The Triads' capture of Shanghai in September, 1853t worsened the 
problems of trade and customs administration. The Chinese customs 
agent fled, the customhouse was destroyed, and government was in abey­
ance. To preserve a semblance of legal trade, Consul Alcock established 
a provisional system of duty payment by collecting promissory notes. 
With Foreign Office sanction, payment of "back duti.es would be enforced. 
Clarendon informed Bonham that "if a Chinese government should be re­
established at Shanghaif either by the rebels or by the imperial author­
ities, the duty payments held by Alcock in promissory notes should be 
paid over to it; otherwise, they should be given back to the mer™ 
?h 
chants,"" In February, 185̂ f a Chinese customhouse was reestablished. 
So:r:e merchants had escaped taxation under A'lcock's system; non-treaty 
vessels were not subject to treaty regulation. "In 'these circumstances 
it was impossible to fulfill the conditions of equal duties upon all# 
23 
demanded by the Board of Trade.The British government withheld its 
decision on the payment of back duties until 18$4, 
The Triads occupied Shanghai until February, 1855« assisted by 
some British residents of the foreign settlement, who supplied arms to 
the Imperialists and the .insurgents. Clarendon admitted this was a 
breach of English neutrality. To enforce neutrality, he suggested that 
British naval officers aid the Shanghai, consul in preventing "as far as 
possible either of the Belligerent Parties from penetrating . . . the 
26 
precincts of the British settlement." In April, iSj&t the cautious 
Bonham was replaced "by Sir John Bowring, former secretary of Jeremy 
?7 
Bentham and an ardent Free Trader. When the Chinese authorities at 
Shanghai and Amoy requested British assistance against the rebels, 
Bowring adhered to the policy of neutrality. He insisted "that it is 
not the purpose of our Government to interfere . . . unless the duty of 
providing for the safety of British subjects or British property should 
28 
require interference." Bowring Instructed Alcock to enforce neutral­
ity rigidly and to punish those who supplied weapons either to the 
29 
rebels or the Imperialists. The Shanghai settlors established an 
"armed neutrality" and in the battle of Muddy Flat they drove the 
Imperialists from the settlement. Foreigners, Bowring observed, "have 
felt equally insecure from Imperialists and Insurgents—alike disorderly 
and law!ess,"̂  
In July, Bowring mentioned the possibility of temporary inter­
vention in the Shanghai crisis, fearing that "if the City is abandoned 
to the Imperial Troops frightful slaughter will accompany their 
31 entrance,' Clarendon instructed Bowring net to interfere by .force, 
3? 
but approved, his attempts to mediate between the belligerents. Ke 
gave, a guarded endorsement of armed neutrality. If protective measures 
by the treaty powers and the Imperial forces failed, "it is competent 
for the residents /of Shanghai/ to associate for purposes of self 
defence: as this however is an assumption of power independent of the 
Chinese Gov/errimen/1, it would not be right that E/ei{J M/ajestv/'s 
33 Superintendents or Consuls should be parties to such an association." 
With French assistance, Consul Alcock constructed a barrier wall around 
the foreign, settlement, "and by thus hindering foreign support of the 
34 
rebels facilitated the imperial siege." The Senior Naval Officer at 
Shanghai refused to assist in constructing and protecting the wall, as 
35 naval forces were to protect only British persons and property, 
Clarendon concurred, and sharply reprimanded Bowring for this breach of 
3o 
neutrality. With French support the Imperial forces drove the rebels 
from Shanghai. The British twice compromised their neutrality during 
ths siege, despite the home government's injunctions against inter­
ference. 
Through the Triad occupations the English reorganised the Shanghai 
customs system. In exchange for payment of the back duties represented 
by Alcock*s j>romissorry notes, the Imperial government sanctioned a 
Foreign Inspectorate at Shanghai. Although Bowring favored payment of 
the notesf Clarendon disagreed. "Under existing circumstances /at 
Shanghai in 1853/ the Treaty arrangements with Chins, must be considered 
as suspended, and . . . Alcock's measures should only . . . /have been/ 
enforced as long as it was reasonable to suppose that the suspension of 
37 
the Imperial Authority was of a temporary character. . . , The 
prolonged interruption in government at Shanghai meant that the Chinese 
lost their claim to the duties. Clarendon reprimanded Bowring and the 
notes were never honored. This 'was perfidy, but the new customs col-
lectorate at Shanghai was far more efficient than the Chinese system, 
and brought the Manchus badly-needed revenue to wage war against the 
Taipings. The Foreign Inspectorate was not a step toward British rule-
in China, nor was it a purposive bias in favor of the Imperial cause. 
A local economic problem required a limited political solution. "Free 
trade and the most-favored-nation treatment, expressive of this com­
mercial interest, were the raison d'etre of the Customs Service, whose 
constant purpose was to provide equal terms of competition both among 
38 
individual traders and among the trading nations in China." Sino-
British cooperation was part of the Sino-barbarian dyarchioal tradi­
ng 
tion."*̂  
While the Triads occupied Shanghai, the simultaneous advance of 
the Taijiing forces caused the British additional consternation. 
Established at Nanking, the Taipings embarked upon a two year northern 
expedition to attack Peking. They foolishly besieged Huai-ch'ing 
instead, of directly advancing to Peking, enabling the Imperial 
40 
government to summon aid from the provinces. Despite some brave 
fighting against the Imperialists, the rebels were poorly prepared for 
the expedition, and suffered a humiliating defeat. The Taipings, 
however, tied up the government forces in North China and shielded thei: 
41 
capital city from assault. In western China, Tseng Kuo-fan's Hunan 
Army was less successful against the rebels, although Tseng began a 
forceful propaganda war to attack Taiping ideology and reassert 
2.6 
Confucianism. Under Shih Ta-Ic'ai, the Taipings reversed Tseng's early 
successes. "As a good administrator and military commander, Shih 
received popular support, whereas the Ch'ing government troops were 
given a cool reception. . . . By j.856 the Taiping western campaign was 
4? 
a success, •' ~ Although the Taipings' rriil.ita.ry strategy was flawed and 
their success uneven, they continued their course of destruction. 
Bearing quickly formed an unfavorable opinion of the Taipings' 
ability to govern, should their march on Peking succeed. He observed 
that 
one sees a disorganising and destroying influence which is every­
where undermining authority's but which seems to furnish few 
materials for the establishment of order and good government. Even 
if the Nanking party should obtain the mastery at Peking; there is 
great reason to apprehend that a very large portion of the vast 
empire would not recognize nor obey its authority, and that it, 
would not be competent to subdue elements of sedition and 
disorder so universally scattered. •* 
Like Bonham, Bowring remarked that no "person of rank,, eminence, or 
influence" had joined the rebels, whose low origins made him doubt 
i|i| 
their quality of leadership. He condemned the political tactics of 
Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, who "introduced enough of mystery to awe and interest 
an ignorant multitude,—enough of fanaticism to rouse their indif­
ference, ---and enough of despotism to control and subdue a people 
2x 5 
predisposed to obedicr.ce and servility. . , ." Bowring considered 
the Taipings x»oorly qualified to provide mature, rational government in 
China. 
The Americans and the British sent separate observers to Nanking 
to meet with the rebels. American Commissioner McLans described the 
bizarre aspects of Taiping Christianity. The Americans "were told that 
. •• . /Hung Hsiu-ch'uan/ had a mission direct from Cod, and from his 
?J{ 
elder brother Jesus Christ to assume the sovereignty of the earth—that 
all who recognized his divine authority were to be his subjects and his 
brethren, and were to present to him tributes in the shape of 'precious 
46 
rifts'. ..." The- Taipings "distinctly repelled" any suggestion that 
they receive religious instruction from missionaries, and insisted that 
foreigners acknowledge Hung's authority. "Except as 'brothers' or 
'subjects' or 'tribute bearers* to the Celestial Kings it appeared that 
the visits e:f foreigners would receive no encouragement, but would on 
4'̂  
the contrary be most unwelcome.' ' "Brethren" of the Heavenly King 
48 
were welcome to trade provided they submitted to Hung's authority, 
Eemini.sce.nt of the Manchns' attitudes toward foreigners, the Taipings' 
arrogance was unconducive to cordial diplomatic relations with the 
British. 
Although the English observers Lewin Bowring and W. H. Medhurst 
added new condemnations of the Taipings to those of Bowring and McLane, 
they praised the rebels' .military spirit, which contrasted with "the 
49 
inertness and imbecility of the Imperial soldiers." Bowring and 
Medhurst questioned whether Hung Hsiu-ch'usn existed. —.The Taipings 
consistently spoke of "the pleasure of the Eastern Xing, his power, his 
i:q 
majesty, ano his influence.The English anticipated the growth cf 
Yang Hsiu-ch'ing's authority, which later caused severe dissension,,among 
% 
the Taipings, Despite Bonham's optimistic assessment, Bowring and 
Medhurst doubted that orderly trade relations with the Taipings could 
be instituted. The rebels' "position is not that of a consolidated 
power, anxious to foster commerce and bent upon the development of its 
resources, but simply that of a military organisation at war with the 
existing Government. . . . Trade , « . is utterly non-existent, . . ." 
To illustrate the Taipings' anti-trade policy, Bowring and Medhurst 
mentioned that the rebels prohibited foreign, vessels access to coal 
deposi ts that ,fa.c5 liteted navigation of the Yangtze River. ̂ ' This 
policy antagonized, the British who wished to open the river trade. The 
Taipings* arrogant leaders, unstable government, and their impairment 
of British trade hardened officials' attitudes against them, and com­
pelled. the British to reassess their relationship with the Imperial 
government. 
The British deprecated the Manchu administration for its military 
incompetence against the rebels, but resigned themselves reluctantly to 
continue diplomatic relations with the government. Although the Tai­
pings "encountered a resistance from the Tartars, and a want of support 
from the native populations in the Northern Provinces," Alcock reported 
. the Imperial Government is as incapable of profiting . . . by 
causes of discouragement to the Insurgents, as these are of seizing the 
Seat of Government.After reviewing the failures of the Taipings 
and. the Imperialists, Alcock predicted an extended civil war. Bowrin 
found it difficult to maintain cordial relations with the Marchus. He 
complained to Foreign Under-secretary Hammond that "it is hard, to get 
on with these stubborn Mandarins-—and though stiff they are as subtle a 
otters.""In the same letter, he intimated using force to exact the 
Manshus' cooperation. Upon receiving accounts of the Taipings at 
Nanking, however, Bowring conceded that the Manchu administration was 
more conducive to British interests than the rebel government, "There 
is no great element at work in this disorganizing revolution which will 
not be less favorable to the extension of commercial and political 
relations with foreigners than is the existing Imperial Government, 
bad. corrupt, proud, and ignorant though it be.""' Clarendon agreed 
w 
that the Manchus favored foreign interests more than the rebels," but 
58 
shared Bowring'b distrust of the Imperialists, 
Through the most-favored-nation clause, 185̂  was the year for 
revision of the Nanking Treaty. Bowring considered opening Canton and 
establishing personal diplomatic relations with Chinese authorities the 
most important issues, but Commissioner Yeh refused to negotiate with 
him on terms of diplomatic equality. The British government demanded 
several treaty revisions; access to the interior of China or free 
navigation on the Yangtze River, legalization of the opium trade, 
elimination of inland transit duties, piracy suppression, establishment 
of satisfactory diplomatic relations with Peking and direct access to 
Imperial viceroys, as well as an interpretation of the treaties accord-
59 ing to the foreign text. When Yeh asserted that he had neither the 
power nor desire to revise the treaties, the British, French, and 
American envoys proceeded north to Peking. After some delay, low-
ranking officials met with the diplomats, and announced that they pos­
sessed no power to negotiate. They insisted that the British had no 
right to demand, treaty revision by virtue cf clauscs in the American 
treaty,̂  denying the British most-favored-nation status. "There seemed 
no hope of any successful result from negotiations conducted under such 
conditions, and the envoys returned, south, convinced , . . that no 
revision of the treaties could be obtained, unless supported and 
6i 
enforced by a demonstration of armed force." By dissembling, the 
Chinese forestalled negotiations, "but their tactics exasperated the 
British, 
In December, 135^, Commissioner Yeh applied to the British for 
assistance against the Red Turban rebels. British Consul Robertson 
optimistically reported that the traditional enmity toward foreigners 
displayed by Canton merchants had changed to pro-foreignism. Cantonese 
spoke "openly and unreservedly of the weakness of their Government 
. . . and their desire to see life and property guaranteed at the 
expense even of foreign intervention. ..." With Clarendon's 
approval}' Bowring reiterated the Liberal policy of non-intervention; 
64 
the British refused to protect any interests but their own. Like 
Bonham, Bowring forbade any British subject to enter the civil war or 
f r-o S 
to provide material aid to either the rebels or the Imperialists. He 
instructed Robertson to warn the rebels that "if by any acts of theirs, 
British Interests are sacrificed, we shall be compelled to visit such 
66 
misdeeds with . . . punishment." Early in 1355> the Red Turbans 
attempted to blockade Canton, further antagonizing the British. Bowring 
warned the rebel chiefs that "any claim to the right of blockade will 
not be admitted, nor will they be allowed to bring their war into 
places peacefully occupied by Foreigners under Treaty guarantees, to 
interrupt lawful Trade, or to molest the persons or property of British 
Residents or Traders," ( The British indirectly aided Yell's expulsion 
of the rebels by the intimidating presence of British naval power at 
Canton;this constituted another bias in favor of the 'Imperialists, 
Yet the British considered it essential to protect their trade rights 
guaranteed by the Nanking Treaty, Although Commissioner Yeh ordered as 
31 
many as 70,000 persons beheaded to purge the Red Turbans from the 
neighborhood of Canton, the trade situation remained unsettled. 
Rebellion continued to disrupt trade, undermining the legal 
guarantees of .regular commerce. In June., 1855s Interpreter Sinclair 
reported that the Taipings threatened Kang-chou. Hs feared that if 
they took the city, the rebels would upset the tea market by blocking 
70 
the trade route to Shanghai, At Canton, restoration of trade remained. 
7i problematic as bands of robbers interfered with the transit- of goods. 
Piracy at Whampoa considerably strained Sino-British relations. Consul 
Robertson berated Commissioner Yeh for permitting piracy, which 
compelled the British to maintain a large naval force in the Whampoa 
72 area to protect their subjects. The English resented disregard, of 
their right to Free Trade, Reluctant to miss a new commercial opportu­
nity, Clarendon Informed Bowring that "if Whampoa becomes a place of 
trade from events with wh/ich/ K/er7 M/ajesty's/ Gov/ernmen/t or 
Brit/ish/ subjects are not connected, /there was/ no objection to 
73 engage in de facto legitimate Trade." While they wished to ensure 
the legality of trade, the English were reJ.uctant to sacrifice their 
interests and were not adverse to adopting pragmatic solutions to 
problems of trade. 
After the establishment of tne Foreign Inspectorate at Shanghai, 
the British experienced new difficulties with customs regulation; which 
necessitated diplomacy with the Manchus. The government proposed an 
interior transit tax on tea which the British considered injurious to 
the expanding trade at Foochow. Bowring instructed Medhurst to ''show 
that the export duties fairly and equally levied wall be far more 
productive to the Imperial revenues. . . . Take this very appropriate 
opportunity of offering your cooperation for the establishment of a 
system of Inspectorship and control, such as exists at Shanghae. . . 
Clarendon strongly desired that the Manchus extend the Shanghai customs 
system to other ports as British merchants protested against irregular­
ity in customs collection. He sought to end. these complaints while 
tempering the Manchus' ant.i-foreignism. "When the Chinese Government 
finds its revenues increased, as they will be largely, by the strict 
enforcement of legal duties, it will become more reconciled not only to 
7̂  foreign trade but to the foreigners engaged in it. . . ." " Clarendon' 
policy was calculated, to serve British economic interests; it was not 
an attempt to gain political authority in China. His policy was a 
response to a local economic problem that gradually assumed political 
importance in Sino-British relations. 
Throughout 1855» Bowring sent unfavorable reports of the Taipings 
to the Foreign Office. He informed Clarendon that the rebels' Christ!™ 
aaity received little attention, and that Taiping influence contracte 
after the failure of the Peking expedition. Although the rebel cause 
weakened in the north and several maritime provinces, "throughout the 
rest of China . . . there is more or less insurrection or disorder of a 
nrj 
kindred character." ' The British attributed the continuation of the 
Taiping movement to the weakness of the government forces and the rebel 
ry O 
tendency to abandon cities after exhausting their resources. The 
Taipings, Bowring concluded, "appear to be losing all popular sympathy, 
and generally /seem/ to be regarded as marauders.As the Taipings 
failed to settle In the provinces and establish a stable government, 
their cause continued to fall in British estimation. 
At the close of 1855, Bowring's disgust with the rebel movement 
superseded Bonham's tacit favor of the Taipings, but British attitudes 
toward the Manchus altered less markedly« The rebels' initial trade 
policy represented a novel acceptance of foreign relations which the 
Manchus significantly lacked. Their subsequent trade policy and their 
seeming Inability to govern deflected British attention to the Imperial 
administration. Although Sino-British relations seldom were cordial, 
they improved through the establishment of the Foreign Inspectorate, 
As a result, the English were drawn into further diplomatic negotiations 
with the Manchus, While the rebellion disrupted established trade 
routes and impaired the transit of English imported goods, it stimulated 
exports of tea ana. silk, which the Chinese could not afford to buy as 
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a result of the havoc in China's interior. ' The British developed new 
tra.de Interests during the early phase of the rebellion,., which they 
strongly desired to expand. This necessitated diplomacy with the Manchu 
to regtilarl.se the trade and. customs system. Yet the Imperial govern­
ment resisted diplomatic pressure for treaty revisions and from the 
British perspective, it represented only a slight improvement over the 
Taipings. 
Despite the home government's injunctions against interference, 
British neutrality in the rebellion was flawed. Breaches in neutrality 
committed by British subjects supplying arms to the rebels and joining 
their ranks did not constitute the official response to the rebellion; 
nevertheless, these activities undermined British policy and embarrassed 
the British government. Delay in commuRicat5.cn between England and 
China caused a lapse between Foreign Office policy and the actions of 
British officials in China, which led to Inconsistencies in the British 
response to the rebellion. The- primary concern of the British was to 
secure the safety of trade, not to render support to the Imperial, 
government. While protecting their trade interests against the rebels, 
the British provided coincidental, indirect assistance to the Manchu 
authorities, which created a tenuous Sino-British alliance. In 185-6, 
the Second China War destroyed the precarious relationship between the 
British and Manchu governments. 
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CHAPTER II 
TREATY REVISION AND THE TAIPING CRISIS 1856-1859 
A temporary waning of the Taiping Rebellion coincided with the 
worsening of Sino-Britlsh relations over the issues of entry into Canton 
and treaty revision. While British policy toward the rebels became 
increasingly biased in the Manchus' favor, the Taipings failed to 
sustain their threat to Western interests and the Imperial government. 
The hiatus in the Taiping movement indirectly hastened the ultimate 
clash between the Chinese and English governments. Relieved from the 
strain of rebellion, the Imperial authorities directed their energies 
toward repelling the Europeans1 persistent efforts to revise the Nanking 
Treaty. The Western powers, unhampered by rebel threats to their 
interests, were free to focus their attention upon exacting new treaties 
from the Manchus. 
Throughout 1856, the British consuls (with the exception of T. T. 
Meadows), and. Sir John Bowring continually deprecated the Taiping move­
ment. The rebels' Christianity worsened British opinion of them. 
Consul Robertson commented upon the imperiousnoss of the Taipings, who 
adopted "the name of a liberal religion without yielding one step of the 
exclusiveness they have been educated .in. . . . The Dynasty , , , may 
be superseded by that of Taeping /'sic7> but the policy will be the 
same. . . ," The rebels' arrogance closely resembled that of the 
Manchusf and correspondingly diminished British sympathy for them. 
4o 
Robertson considered Taiping Christianity hopelessly decadent. "There 
is no Civilization in it beyond the assumption of Holy names, which are 
desecrated for the material purpose of forming a new Dynasty . . , it 
O 
is a watchword and nothing more."'" While disgusted with the rebels * 
use of Christian doctrine to advance their cause, the British were more 
concerned by the Taipings' inability to govern. 
Although the Taiping movement revived, Bowring reported, it merely 
disorganized Chinese society.*' He considered the rebels' lack of an 
effective system of government a serious deficiency. .Bowring, however, 
coupled his denunciation of the Taiping' movement with an equally un­
favorable report of the Imperial administration. "I find nowhere any 
growing confidence in or affection for the Imperial Government," Bowring 
wrote. "It is utterly unable to grapple with the difficulties of its 
position. . . . These revolutionary bands snake all confidence in The 
Peking Government, whose blindness, pride and obstinancy seem impervious 
Ij. 
to ail .lessons of experience." Neither the rebels nor t,he Imperialists 
held a strong political ascendancy in China, and the civil war reached 
a stalemate, which briefly permitted the English to regain their position 
as neutral observers. 
In May, 3.856, the Taipings routed the Imperialists at Chinkiang 
and. threatened Shanghai. The prospect of another occupation and siege 
dismayed the British. After ejection of the Triads at Shanghai, British 
commercial interests had expanded, and. British officials strongly 
reacted against a new threat to trade. Consul Robert,son suggested chat 
the policy of neutrality was obsolete. "Times and circumstances may 
occur when that policy can be carried a little too far . . , and our 
tacit declaration of non-intervention be construed into weakness. . . ." 
He proposed that the British use their naval forces to intimidate the 
rebels, and that the city of Shanghai be placed under a joint protector­
ate of the tres.ty powers to avert attack.̂  Bowring remained complacent 
about the safety of British subjects, but feared the stagnation of 
trade. He offered "to concur in any arrangement by which all parties 
would be interdicted from making the Five Ports the seat of hostilities" 
7 and favored Robertson's recommendations. Clarendon agreed that British 
interests could not be sacrificed in the civil war. Pie instructed 
Bowring tc cooperate with the Americans to defend their common interests 
at Shanghai. Bowring was to inform the rebels that "any attack upon 
the City of Shanghai which is full of British Subjects and property will 
be repelled by force of arms? but that the British Government will in 
no way interfere in the Civil, war if the Ports in which British commerce 
is carried on and to which British Subjects are committed are respected 
8 
by the insurrectionary forces." 
Clarendon did not consider his policy on the defense of Shanghai 
a breach in neutrality. "It would be unjustifiable to allow the great 
amount of British Property at Shanghai to be exposed to plunder. . . . 
It a,ppears to Her Majesty's Gov/ernmen/t- that a bona fide observance of 
neutrality . . . does not require . . . such a sacrifice of British 
9 Interests." The American representative, Dr, Parker, hinted at joint 
Anglo-American assistance to the Manchus. Bowring rejected any sug­
gestion that the British compromise their neutrality. He informed 
Parker that "if the Imperial Government should make the armed inter­
vention of Great Britain in its favori the condition of concessions 
42 
political or commercial I . . , advise your Ecxellency that I am not 
10 
authorized to promise such intervention. . . . "  C l a r e n d o n  approved. 
11 
Bowring's response to the American. Although the British continued 
to avoid direct assistance to the government, they compromised their 
neutrality in favor of the Manchus by extending their protection to all 
the treaty ports. They had expanded their scope of interest to include 
the port cities rather than the foreign settlements alone. As a result 
of this alteration in British policy, a greater amount of incidental 
aid. to the Manchus was inevitable, but the British regarded themselves 
as neutral in the civil war. 
In the latter months of I8j6, internecine strife ruined the Tai­
pings' organization and leadership. The Eastern King's steadily-growing 
power and arrogance led the jealous Hung Hsiu-ch'uan to order his exe­
cution. The Northern King and his followers murdered the Eastern King 
12. 
and twenty thousand of his adherents. The Northern King's ambition 
grew in turn, and he attempted to assassinate the Assistant King Shih 
Ta-k'ai, In November, the Northern King was decapitated. Taiping 
leadership disintegrated. "Only Shih Ta-k'ai, the Assistant King, 
remained to share power with the Heavenly King, 'who withdrew more and 
more from the real world and left near relatives to speak in his 
1 3 
name. Bereft of capable leaders, the rebel cause faltered. 
% 
While they knew of the Taiping purges, the British doubted that 
strife among the rebels would end rebellion in China. After the death 
of the Eastern King, Bowring observed that "on the whole, the reports 
are- more favorable to the Imperialists," but he saw "no present prospect 
14 
. « . of anything like the restoration of tranquility." Chinese 
Secretary Waie predicted the collapse of the Taiping movement from its 
15 internal dissent. Like Bowring, he did not foresee restoration of 
peace from dissolution of the Taipings, "An, attractive precedent of 
the facilities and privileges of sedition has "been established, and 
. . . the multitude who have tasted the sweets of a change . . . will 
16 
be slow to accept again the inglorious condition of the working man." 
Proliferation of rebel groups led the British to anticipate a prolonged 
civil war in China. 
The crisis in the Taiping movement continued through I858, pro­
viding the Chinese and British authorities some respite from the 
problems of rebellion. The Taipings refused to establish diplomatic 
1? relations with foreigners, removing potential distractions to Sino-
British negotiations. The British increasingly discounted a rebellion 
that failed to defeat the. incompetent government forces. Bowring 
forwarded several reports on the disorganization rampant among the 
18 
Imperial armies. "The weakness and corruption of the Mandarins," he 
observed, "serve to counterpoise the progress of the Insurrectionists. 
What appears most to menace the rebel cause is the dissensions and 
19 defections among Its principal leaders at Nanking. ..." He pin­
pointed the Taipings' greatest weakness: inadequate leadership. 
While Shih Ta.-k'ai remained at Nanking until May, 185?, he.jfgiled 
* 20 
to assume administrative authority. He left the Taipings and formed 
an independent campaign. "With him went some of the best military 
commanders, and his departure was thus another grave setback to the 
Taiping movement.Although the Heavenly King appointed a number of 
new officials to the Taiping hierarchy, none were as capable as the 
Eastern or Assistant Kings. The Taipings floundered in battle. While 
they retained forces in the cities along the banks of the Yangtze, they 
lost control, of the river to Tseng Euo-fan's army. Supplies for the 
Taiping array became difficult to obtain without the navigation of the 
22 
Yangtze, further weakening the rebel cause. "The Taipings were thus 
on the defensive. Their military moves were worked out in conferences 
by the commanders of the main Taiping units themselves without regard 
to the government of the Heavenly King. . . . These commanders thought 
in military terms and were no longer truly concerned with . . . the 
23 
revolutionary purpose of the Taipings." The rebels lost the central 
organization necessary for concerted warfare. They won intermittent 
victories against the government, but they lacked their previous unity 
and Ideological fervor. The movement steadily deteriorated. Disorga­
nisation of the Taipings made English neutrality easier to Implement, 
and enabled the British to concentrate upon improving their trade and. 
diplomatic relations with the Imperial government. 
The recession of the Taiping Rebellion led to a revival In trade. 
24 
The import trade expanded, and exports reached new heights. Consul 
Robertson reported that "the shipments of Tea and silk will be this year 
as large as in any former season. ... As long as the Imperialists 
and Rebels confine their operations to the Yangtze Kiang and leave the 
tea and silk producing districts . . . free from their ravages, they 
25 may go on fighting until one or the other is worn out." The elandes-
26 
tine weapons trade continued. Importation of weapons at Shanghai was 
?7 forbidden'" until Clarendon informed Bowring that he possessed no legal 
28 
power to halt the trade, The weapons trade was only one source of 
^5 
profit derived from the rebellion. The rebels blocked certain transit 
routes to Shanghai, diverting a large proportion of the tea trade to 
Foochon. As a result of the Taiping Rebellion, the treaty port system 
began its long-awaited development. The currency situation remained 
problematic, and the British continued imports of 'bullion to pay for 
tea and silk. The currency system remained chaotic until 1857, when the 
29 
Shanghai tael became the universal coin of exchange. Although trade 
expanded in 1856, it remained irregular. Dissatisfied with Sino-
British commerce, the Foreign Secretary contemplated new efforts to 
renegotiate the treaties. 
As the American and French governments had specified I856 as the 
year for revision of their treaties, the British had allies in their 
attempt to improve the trade system. Clarendon suggested sending a 
legation of American, French, and British representatives to Peking, 
noting that "the negotiations for this purpose are more likely to be 
30 successful if supported by the presence of a considerable naval force.' 
The American government instructed Dr. Parker to negotiate for residence 
01 foreign diplomats at Peking, unlimited trade in China, freedom of 
religion in China, and reform of the Chinese courts. Bowring concur­
red only on the need for residence of envoys at Peking. He favored the 
limited objective of opening the Yangtze River to trade, and considered 
4 32 the other points of Parker's instructions chimerical.. Parker received 
French and British diplomatic support. He departed for the Peiho in 
July, but Chinese authorities delayed him at Shanghai with promises of 
negotiation. "Conference succeeded conference, talk was drowned in 
talk, and the skilled Chinese diplomats kept . . . /Parker/ in leash 
46 
33 
from clay to day; until it became too late to go to the Peiho." Diplo­
matic relations remained unsatisfactory! the American mission had 
ae complished nothing. 
The Canton city question and violation of their treaty rights 
through piracy led the English into war with the Imperial government. 
In 18.56, anti-foreignism at Canton re-emerged. Cantonese threatened 
34 
foreigners with death for entering the city, denying to the British 
what they considered a fundamental right. The Imperial government 
insisted that foreign diplomats confer with Commissioner Yeh to discuss 
treaty revision. Yeh annoyed the foreign representatives by refusing 
3C> 
diplomatic' intercourse,"" The mutual hostility between feh and the 
foreign representatives intensified over the Issue of piracy. Rapid 
development of piracy around Canton and Hong Kong, along with constant 
attacks upon Kowloon necessitated British ordinances which granted 
Chinese-owned vessels colonial registration, permission to fly the 
36 
British flag, and the right to British protection. The Imperial 
government's chronic inability to suppress piracy forced the British 
to assurae the unwanted responsibility of police power in the China Sea. 
To protect their interests, the British had resorted to an expedient 
which soon created new problems of jurisdiction. 
In late 1855» the Chinese seized two lorchas flying the British 
flag, on charges of salt smuggling. At Bowring's request, British 
37 naval authorities intervened, and Clarendon approved his decision. 
By 1856, Clarendon was exasperated with the Imperial government. "It 
is hopeless to expect co-operation from the Chinese authorities,11 he 
wrote, "and it appears impossible to create any mixed Tribunals for the 
47 
trial of pirates. . . . Those Authorities though they will not ask for 
the assistance of H/er/ M/ajesty/'s Ships of War are content that it 
38 
should "be afforded. . . .The Imperial government's inadequate 
measures against piracy, its intransigence over treaty revision, and 
the anti-foreignism inherent in its policies increasingly aggravated 
the British. The Arrow incident exhausted British patience with the 
Manehu government. 
On 8 October 1856, Commissioner Yeh ord.ered the lorcna Arrow to 
be seized. A Hong Kong merchant owned the vessel, which was mastered 
by a British subject, "An act of aggression on an individual ship thus 
granted British papers could be considered only as a means of adminis-
39 iering a slap to the responsible British authorities.. Yeh claimed 
that the lorcha was owned by another Chinese merchant, that a notorious 
pirate was aboard the vessel, and that contrary to English assertions, 
4o 
the British flag was not flying at the time of seizure. He did not 
know that the vessel's sailing license had expired. He arrested the 
crew without the British consul's warrant, and "a British ship in 
Chinese waters is British soil, and all on board, persons or property, 
41 
are under British protection." English jurisdiction applied through 
extraterritorality. Consul Parkes requested Yeh to apologize, release 
the twelve-man crew, and in future to respect the British flag. Yeh 
insisted upon detaining three of the crew for examination, and berated 
the English for their colonial registration of Chinese vessels, which 
42 
created, confusion. Clarendon regarded expiration of the vessel's 
license "a matter of British regulation" and thought Parkes's demands 
43 
"very moderate under the circumstances," " Yeh's actions outraged 
Clarendon, who approved retaliation to obtain redress of British 
44 
grievances. With the Crimean War over and. the India Mutiny yet to 
begin, the British adopted a belligerent policy toward China. 
The problem, at Canton remained local for several months after the 
Arrow seizure. After Yeh refused to meet Parkes's demands, the English 
seized an Imperial war-junk. Yeh finally released the twelve prisoners, 
but upon conditions that Parkes found unacceptable. "Mr. Parkes there­
fore refused to receive them, and, as there had been no apology 
l\ K 
offered, the question passed into the hands of the naval authorities." 
British Admiral Seymour rapidly seized several forts around Canton and 
destroyed a fleet of war-junks. For three months the British sporadi­
cally shelled Canton, but Yeh refused to submit. Redress for the Arrow 
incident constituted only part of the motives behind the Sino-British 
conflict, "The fundamental cause of the ensuing war was the desire of 
the Western Powers to perfect the work inaugurated as they imagined in 
46 
the treaties of the forties." 
At the end of 1856, the rupture between the British and Chinese 
governments remained minor. Clarendon continued to instruct Bowring 
upon diplomacy for obtaining regular duties collection, as the British 
government would ''admit no obligation to supply the vigilance which the 
4? 
Chinese Authorities ought themselves to exercise." Clarendon-regarded 
* 
the Chinese prejudice against the system as a formidable barrier to its 
extension, and authorized Bowring to end the Shanghai system if a 
48 
general Foreign Inspectorate could not be established. The earlier 
work toward regularizing the customs system was useless without Chinese 
cooperation. While the British preferred diplomacy to war with the 
49 
Manchus, they were impatient fox- substantial treaty revision rather than 
local reforms. The Arrow war provided, the final justification to 
redress diplomatic grievances. 
Determined to exact a new treaty from the Manchus, the British 
government appointed the Earl of Elgin High Commissioner and Pleni­
potentiary to China. Elgin was instructed to demand redress and. 
compensation for losses and injuries sustained "by British subjects, 
residence for the British envoy at Peking, and direct written coiamu-
49 
nication with Chinese officials. Clarendon enjoined Elgin 
to induce the Chinese Government to consent to throw open the ports 
of China generally to foreign commerce, and to allow the subjects 
of foreign Powers freely to communicate with the great cities in the 
interior, but more especially with those which are situated, on the 
large rivers and those lying immediately within the sea-board of 
the north-eastern coast. . » . It would be desirable that your 
Excellency should include the important city of Nankin /sic/ by 
name, as one of the places to which British merchants should, have 
access? but as that city is now in the hands of the insurgents, it 
might be best to obtain in general terms permission to frequent ĝe 
Yang-tze-keang river, and to trade with the cities on its banks.v 
The British sought to expand and to regularize the China trade. Elgin 
was to negotiate upon tra.de duties, internal taxation, and legalisation 
of the opium trade. The British claimed no exclusive advantages for 
51 their trade; Elgin cooperated with the French and the Americans. 
Begardless of the court's hostility to foreign trade and its opposition 
to treaty revision, the British persistently asserted their Free Trade 
interests. 
In June, the Chinese and the British agreed to localize the 
<2 
hostilities at Canton, a policy that the home government approved. 
The India Mutiny delayed settlement of the Chine, problem, as troops 
bound for China were diverted to India.. Bereft of military support for 
his journey to the Peiho, Elgin waited. Clarendon had mentioned an 
attack upon Canton as an unfavorable alternative to a demonstration of 
force at Peking. Elgin decided that "he must follow his instructions 
and make at least an attempt to induce the Peking government to settle 
outstanding questions by . . . diplomacy, but that, in the case of a 
53 diplomatic repulse, he must be prepared to strike promptly at Canton." 
In August, the English blockaded Canton. Delajrs in coordinating 
meetings and resolutions among the foreign envoys, -and lack of suffi­
cient military force destroyed the opportunity for the journey to 
Peking. The British settled upon the limited objective of subduing 
Canton. Although the blockade induced considerable distress at Canton 
by halting trade, the English observed that the Cantonese made no 
54 
preparations for war. In December, Admiral Seymour completed the 
blockade with newly-arrived supplementary forces. The envoys informed 
Commissioner Yeh that if he yielded to the British right of entry, and 
provided compensation for British losses at Canton, the city would be 
55 
spared." Yeh refused. In reply the English and French bombarded 
Canton, seizing it on 29 December 185?. 
While the Cantonese passively resisted the allied occupation, in 
56 
February, Elgin thought it safe to suspend hostilities against China." 
Yeh was arrested and exiled to Calcutta, where he died. "Canton being 
thus disarmed and held, the ambassadors were free to turn their atten­
tion to the principal object of their mission, negotiating with the 
57 court of Peking, and securing a revision of the treaties." Elgin 
requested the Imperial government to send an accredited plenipotentiary 
58 
to Shanghai by the end of March. The Manchus failed to respond. In 
t^A 
his determinant ion to break the impasse between the British and Chinese 
over treaty revision, Elgin was prepared to use force. He requested 
Admiral Seynour to ensure that a fleet of gunboats would be available 
50 
at Poking. Elgin departed for the Peiho. At Tientsin, the English, 
French, Russian, and American envoys launched a diplomatic onslaught 
against the Manchus. 
On 20 April, the foreign envoys assembled at Taku, Elgin re­
quested to confer with a Chinese representative empowered to revise the 
treaties. On 10 May, the Chinese envoy announced that his government 
refused to enlarge his powers of negotiation..Elgin had warned the 
6i 
Chinese that such a delay would invite hostilities. He accordingly 
directed Admiral Seymour "to summon the Commander of the /Taku/ forts 
to deliver them temporarily into your hands, on the assurance that you 
will return them when the negotiations in which the Plenipotentiaries 
are engaged shall have been brought to a satisfactory issue, and If the 
summons ... be disregarded, to take them by force." " As the Chinese 
refused the English demand, Seymour captured the forts. The envoys 
proceeded inland to Tientsin and the Chinese acceded to their request 
for accredited negotiators. "The appointment of these high officials 
was evidence that, at last, the court of Peking realised the seriousness 
of the situation, and was resolved to free itself, by negotiation, from 
the pressure of an armed occupation of the portal of the capital." 
To open negotiations, the Chinese met with the foreign envoys sepa­
rately. While Elgin's brothers Lord Frederick Bruce, nominally headed 
the English negotiators, the Interpreters Mr. Wade and Mr. Lay performed 
the work of revision. Helpless under the determined browbeating of Mr,. 
52 
Lay, the Chinese acquiesced, to British demands. 
The Chinese consented to the toleration of Christianity, measures 
to suppress piracy, revision of tariffs and customs duties, and the use 
of English in official correspondence. They reluctantly conceded the 
opening of the Yangtze River to trade. To forestall the opening of 
China, the authorities requested that Europeans refrain from claiming 
their right of access to the Yangtze until It was freed from rebel 
64 6 5 
influence* The Chinese resisted granting envoys residence at Peking, 
which entailed a drastic change in their system of foreign relations. 
The English Insisted upon this point, as they had long considered it 
essential to proper diplomatic intercourse between China and England. 
Unable to resist, the Chinese j'ielded. The final treaty draft contained 
five clauses that strongly affected future Sino™British relations. 
Under Article III, the British diplomat was granted the right of resi­
dence at Peking, and in Article V, the Chinese acknowledged British 
claims to diplomatic equality. Britain received most-favored-nation 
status through Article LIV, and the right of tariff revision through 
Article XXVI. Article X contained provisions for opening the Yangtze 
66 
to trade. On 26 June 1857, the English Treaty of Tientsin was signed, 
subject to ratification one year later at Peking, 
The treaty represented a major step toward opening China to 
foreign influence. Chinese and British alike realized the importance 
of permitting envoys residence at Peking; China would lose its tradi­
tional status as a tribute-nation. Opposition to Westernization of 
their diplomatic relations was not merely Chinese "arrogance".. The 
dynasty sough* to protect a political and cultural heritage against 
53 
foreign encroachment. Determined to establish Free Trade in China, the 
British demanded diplomatic access to Peking as a means of resolving 
commercial problems. The treaty was an instrument for regularizing 
commerce and preventing the Imperial government from wielding arbitrary 
authority over British traders. Although reluctant to permit Western 
influence in China, the Imperial government was too weak to resist. 
Prior to the Treaty of Tientsin, duties levied on goods in transit 
varied among .districts, an irregularity irksome to British traders. The 
English resolved this problem by requiring publication of transit duties 
at the portsf and obtaining the right to commute the duties by paying a 
67 
small percentage of the value of goods in transit. When the British 
completed the negotiations for tariff reform, a five-percent general 
duty was levied on commodities not specifically mentioned in the tariff. 
Opium, legalized under the treaty, commanded a duty of approximately 
seven percent, French authorities preferred a low duty on silk, a.s 
they were most interested in that commodity; the duty remained well 
68 
below the standard five-percent ad valorem. The Chinese retained the 
duty previously levied on tea. Although the tea duty was considerably 
higher than the standard rate, the English, levied duties on tea in 
69 
England that compensated for the rate paid in China. The duties were 
compromises designed to satisfy both the Chinese and. the treaty powers. 
The English and Chinese appended, rules to the tariffs as additional 
safeguards to regular trade. In consideration of the i"ebellion existing 
in China, munitions and implements of war were declared contraband goods, 
while a uniform customs administration based, upon the Shanghai system 
70 was to be established at each port. After years of futile diplomacy, 
54 
the British achieved treaty revision through force. Trade was regulated 
by law, and the channels of diplomatic intercourse opened. The English 
thought that they finally had induced the Manchus to recognise their 
right of Free Trade. 
Two problems remained that marred the English success in treaty 
revision: the continued agitation against foreigners at Canton, and 
the difficulty of opening the Yangtze to trade. Foreign Secretary 
Malmesbury was dissatisfied with the mixed government of French, 
English, and Chinese authorities at Canton. He ordered the city placed 
7'i under martial law, but then gave Elgin discretion to modify his in-
striaetions.1 ~ By the end of 1858, the city was comparatively tranquil. 
Upon receiving the right to navigate the Yangtze, the British were 
eager to reconnoiter the area and select new ports to be opened. In 
exchange for permission to navigate the Yangtze up to Hankow, Elgin 
agreed to reconunend that the British government establish its envoy 
outside Peking, This agreement was not recorded in official docu-
7̂  ments, ̂  but in a despatch to Malmesbury, Elgin referred to the problems 
associated with his proposed mission. 
The Treaty-right to navigate the Yang-tze, and to resort to 
ports upon that river for purposes of trade, was . . . made contin­
gent on the re-establishment of the Imperial authority in the ports 
in question; becat'se, as we have seen fit to affect neutrality 
between the Emperor of China and the rebels, we could not . . . 
require him to give us rights and protection in places actually 
occupied by a Power which we treat with the same respect as his 
own.'' * 
Elgin knew that he had no right to navigate the river until ratification 
of the Treaty of Tientsin. He thought it necessary, however, to 
publicise the opening of the river to foreign trade by an ostensible 
75 tour cf inspection among the ports. Elgin's mission on the Yangtze 
55 
River refocused British attention onto the Taiping rebels, long-ignored 
as a waning influence during the period of treaty revision. 
Elgin considered it "essential to the proper appreciation of our 
position . » . that we should obtain . . . more accurate information 
than we possessed as to the situation and prospects of the parties to 
the civil war. ..." While he observed a lack of popular support 
for either the rebels or the Imperialists/ Elgin reported that the 
77 government forces held more of the Yangtze district than the rebels. 
The Taipings' control of their districts was precarious. "The rebels 
do not appear in any part to command . . . /the Yangtze/ beyond the 
range of their guns. Nowhere did we see any rebel junks, and both 
78 
Nankin and Ngan-ching were closely beleaguered by Imperial fleets." 
The river cities were decimated by rebels and Imperialists; Elgin 
found little evidence of thriving commercial activity. He reported. 
that Chinkla.ng "has been taken and retaken ana has experienced therefore 
the tend.er mercies both of rebels and Imperialists. I never before saw 
such a scene of desolation. . . . With certain differences of degree, 
this was the condition of every city which I visited on my voy-
79 aget . . . Elgin's trip up the Yangtze and his lengthy report on 
the Taipings were not prepatory for subsequent British intervention in 
the rebellion. The British sought only to gain information on the 
prospects ox the river trade, and to reassure the Chinese of their good­
will. The rebel occupation, however, clearly was unconducive to the 
security of trade. 
In spite of Elgin's wish to avoid a confrontation with them, the 
8o 
Taipings fired upon a British ship bearing the flag of truce. The 
56 
British returned the fire and the following day, they renewed battering 
the Taiping forts. In his despatch to Malmesbury, Elgin explained his 
actions. 
Although the rebel.s had had a good deal the worst of it in the 
transactions of the afternoon /of the first exchange/, it was 
impossible to say what view they might take of the result, if . . . 
we were to proceed quietly on our voyage. ... It was equally 
impossible to say in what guise we might present ourselves on our 
return, or what inconveniences might arise if the rebels had. any 
doubt as to whether we or they were the stronger party. It wa.s 
therefore determined that we should re-descend the river . . . and 
punish severely some of the forts which had fired upon us,®1i 
Although the British exchanged fire with the Taipings, Elgin was 
prepared to assure them that the British had. no intention of intervening 
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in the civil war. Except for a minor incident, the British remained 
unmolested, for the rest of their journey. Despite the Taipings' de­
struction of the river cities, the British selected three new ports to 
be opened; Chinkiang, Kiukiang, and Hankow. By provision of the Treaty 
of Tientsin, only Chinkiang could immediately be opened as a port of 
trade. Kiukiang and. Hankow would be opened to trade when the river was 
cleared of the rebels, Although the Taipings impaired the expansion of 
trad.e- the British had no desire to intervene in the civil ws,r to 
advance their interests on the Yangtze River. 
Before receiving Elgin's report on the Taipings, Malmesbury 
instructed Lord Frederick Bruce on his conduct toward the Manchu author­
ities if they requested assistance against the rebels. Bruce's diplo­
matic status enabled him to assume Bowring's position as Superintendent 
of Trade, and to negotiate with the Chinese. Malmesbury carefully 
explained his views on the rebellion, "It would certainly be desirable," 
he acknowledged, "that peace should be restored to the interior . 0 . 
5? 
/of China/ and . . . navigation of the Yangzekeang . . . opened to 
foreign intercourse; "but . . . it is impossible to judge whether any 
attempt to serve the purposes of the . . , /imperial/ Government by 
contributing to suppress , . . /the rebellion/ might not do more harm 
83 
than good." - Although it was difficult to use British naval power 
against scattered rebel groups, Malmesbury thought that capturing a few 
rebel strongholds might constitute adequate assistance to the Imperial 
84 
government. Malmesbury, however, cautioned Bruce that "Her Majesty's 
Government would not be disposed to enter upon such a course without 
previous concert with and without the assured cooperation of its 
85 
allies." He admitted that the British had little knowledge of the 
rebels' position, but d.ecided that the rebellion- was too widespread for 
the allied powers to quell. "At the present state of our knowledge," 
he concluded, "it would not be proper . . . to encourage any expectation 
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of material assistance on our part." As they awaited further infor-
laation on the rebels, the British returned to the problera of treaty 
ratification. 
In accordance with Elgin's suggestion, the British government 
established its envoy at Shanghai, but required that the Chinese occa­
sionally receive him at Peking. Malmesbury insisted that Bruce "make 
the Chinese authorities . . « understand that Her Majesty's Government 
do not renounce the right of permanent residence /at Peking/, and « . . 
will instantly exercise it, if . . , difficulties are thrown in the 
way of communications between Hex' Majesty's Minister and the Central 
Government « . » or any disposition /is/ shown to evade . t , the 
Treaty,"0' On 26 April, Bruce arrived in Hong Kong, In June, he 
reported that the Chinese were using tactics to delay treaty ratifica-
88 
tion. Instead of going to Peking to receive Bruce and the French 
envoy, M. de Bourboulon, the Imperial commissioners lingered at Soochow. 
Bruce expressed his displeasure with the Chinese authorities and 
emphasized his determination to exchange treaty ratifications at 
89 
Peking. He anticipated the problems Elgin experienced the previous 
year. Bruce requested that Rear-Admiral Hope ascertain if preparations 
were made to receive the French and British envoys at Tientsin. "Should 
the reply be in the negative," Bruce said, "I would suggest that . . . 
/the Chinese/ should be called upon to transmit the intelligence to 
Pekin, warning them at the same time that if a reply is not received 
within a certain fixed period, the Imperial Government will be held 
90 
responsible for the consequences." The Chinese commissioners left 
Shanghai for Peking* On 20 June, the foreign envoys, joined by the 
American plenipotentiary John Ward, arrived at Taku. 
The Chinese closed the Peiho River. "The rabble on the shore 
asserted that there were no officers in the /Taku/ forts, which were. 
Manned solely by militia, and had been reconstructed by the people as 
protection against rebels, not by order of the Government for the 
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purpose of keeping the Allied forces out of the river." ~ Bruce ignored 
these assertions, recognizing the fortifications at Taku. as an attempt 
by the court, war-faction to halt the envoys' progress. He considered 
it imperative to proceed to Tientsin, which entailed defeating the 
forces at the Peiho. Bruce sought to discredit the war-faction and 
"impress the Chinese with a just idea of our- national power and equal-
92 ity. The envoys requested Rear~Adm.iral Hope to open the Peiho. On 
59 
2-f- June, Hope sent an ultimatum to the Chinese, which they ignored. 
The Chinese successfully resisted the subsequent British attack. "The 
prestige of British arms suffered a serious "blow, while the credit of 
93 the war party among the Chinese was now fully established." - Ward 
left the French and British envoys to conclude ratification of the 
American treaty at Peitang. As the French forces were in Annam, the 
French minister relied upon British military power to enforce his 
government's claim to treaty ratification. Embarrassed, the English 
and French envoys returned to Shanghai, 
Chinese resistance to treaty ratification placed the British In a 
difficult situation. The English persistently regarded China as a 
sovereign state, attempting to draw the Imperial government into Western 
modes of diplomacy. Bruce observed that "in China international re-
lations have been always studiously ignored by the Government; and. in 
no single instance has a Foreign Minister succeeded in obtaining 
admission to the capital, except on performance of the 'kotow,' or 
oZj. 
ceremony of vassalage, or in the character of tribute-bearer."'' The 
British rejected Chinese modes of diplomacy and became increasingly 
determined to humble the government. Bruce urged the new Foreign 
Secretary, Lord John Sussell, to send a large force to China to exact 
treaty ratification from the Manchus. "The more manifest our superi­
ority the shorter will be the contest, and the more inclined will be 
the Emperor to abandon those pretensions of superiority which form the 
real obstacle to amicable relations with the Government and the people 
O K  
01 China.." In conjunction with the French, Russell agreed to dispatch 
OQ 
military aid to achieve ratification * The British, however, sought 
6o 
a limited campaign against the Imperial government, "There are no 
reasons," Russell asserted, "for interrupting friendly relations with 
97 the Chinese at Shanghae, Canton, and elsewhere." The Foreign 
Secretary thought -that news of British preparations for war might deter 
98 
the Chinese from, further hostilities,. While anxious to ratify the 
treaty, the English cautiously avoided an expensive large-scale war, 
which would disrupt tx*ade. 
Before resorting to force against the Manchus, the British decided 
to apply diplomatic pressure. They demanded that the Chinese apologize 
for the Taku incidentf permit the British minister to arrive at Tientsin 
in a British vessel, and convey the minister to Peking with due honor to 
99 ratify the treaty. The British revoked their agreement with the 
Chinese on residence of foreign envoys in China. "It rests henceforward 
Kith Her Majesty . to decide whether or not she shall instruct her 
100 
Minister to take up his abode permanently at Pekln." In January, 
i860, Bruce received a despatch from Russell, instructing him to inform 
the Chinese of the British demands and to insist upon the emperor's 
101 
assent within thirty days. If the Chinese refused to cooperate, "the 
British naval and military authorities will proceed to adopt such 
measures as they deem advisable for the purpose of compelling the 
Eraperor of China to observe the engagements contracted for him by his 
102 
Plenipotentiaries at Tien-tsin. ..." Russell also instructed Bruce 
to exact a large indemnity from the Chinese If they failed to comply 
i 'i 
with his demands.'"1' Secure from internal threat to its authority by 
the waning of the Taiping Rebellion, the Imperial government could 
resist treaty ratification. The British., however, were thoroughly 
61 
aroused against the government, and the Taipings were about to stage 
their last great offensive. The Manchu dynasty was in grave danger of 
collapsing under the strain of war and rebellion. 
British policy toward the Imperial government was fraught with 
inconsistencies. Although they wished the government to subdue the 
Taiping Rebellion, the British simultaneously weakened it by demands 
for treaty revision. As the authorities failed to tranquilize China, 
the British incurred unwanted responsibility for maintaining the 
security of trade, which worsened their relations with the Imperial 
government. Weak in central military organization; the Chinese govern­
ment was powerless to act eoncertedly against the Taipings or the 
European barbarians. The Manchus were forced to delay treaty revision 
for as long as possible, but this only hardened British determination 
to exact new treaties. 
British negotiations with the Manchus marked their continued 
acceptance of Imperial authority. When the rebellion subsided and the 
threat of ratification became Imminent, the Manchus resisted British 
demands. The British, however, had exacted important diplomatic and 
trade concessions from the Imperial government, which they insisted the 
Manchus honor by ratifying the treaty. The arrangement for Elgin's 
journey up the Yangtze constituted the last vestige of cordiality 
between the Chinese and British. The India Mutiny ended in 1859» 
enabling the British to coerce the Manchus into complying with their 
demands. The Chinese triumph over the British at Taku, the culmination 
of resistance to the treaties, compelled the British to adopt sterner 
measures to exact the Manchus* cooperations 
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Îbid., p. 420. 
3-Ibid., p. 421. 
•̂ Ibid,, pp. 410-4110 
*̂ F.O. 17/242/82, Clarendon to Bowring, 22 March 1856. 
F̂.O. 17/257? Clarendon to Admiralty, 18 July 1856. 
30 _ 
Morse, The international Relations of the Chinese Empire9 vol, 
i» p. ̂ 23. 
4o 
Ibid., pp. 422-424. 
4-1 
Ibid.s p. 425. 
'̂ Ibid., pp. 426-427. 
^̂ F.O. 17/243/243, Clarendon to Bowring, 10 December I856. 
64 
44 , 
I Did, 
45, 
1, p. 4-28 
•riorse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol. 
William C. Costin, Great Britain and China, 1833-1860, (London? 
Oxford University Press. 1937/7 P* 205« 
F̂'.O. 17/243/234» Clarendon to Bowring, 9 December I856. 
48 . , 
Ibid. 
49 
Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol. 
50 
Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers, "Correspondence 
Relative to the Earl of Elgin's Special Missions to China and Japan; 
I85? to 1859/' 1859s XXXIII, /25?i/f Number 4, Clarendon to Elgin, 20 
April 1857. 
e>i 
" Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol. 
1f p. 488„ 
i7/270/279f Bowring to Clarendon, 5 June 1857s and 
Clarendon3 s reply, F.O. 17/262/171, Clarendon to Bowing, 6 August 1857<• 
CO / ) 
"-Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol, 
1, p. 494, 
F.O. 17/2?2/390 Enclosure, Memorandum from student interpreter 
Mr. Alabaster to Bowring, 4 October 1857> in Bowring to Clarendon, 5 
October 1857. 
•'"Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol. 
1t p» 4 
56 
• Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers, "Correspondence 
Relative tc . . . Elgin's Special Missions . . .," Number 101 Enclosure 
2, Elgin to Rear-Admiral Seymour and. Major-General Van Straubenzee, 6 
February 1858, in Elgin to Clarendon, 8 February 1858. 
"'''Morse. The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol. 
1, p. 506. 
58 
Great Britain. Parliament, Parliamentary Papers, "Correspondence 
Relative to , . . Elgin's Special. Missions . . Number 102 Enclosure 
Is Elgin to the Senior Secretary of Si-ate at Pekin, 11 February 1858, in 
Elgin to Clarendon, 12 February 1858. 
~̂ Ibid., Number 120 Enclosure 2, Elgin to Seymour, 2 March 1858, 
in Elgin to Clarendon, 2 March I858. 
65 
6c* 
i» p. 51̂  
Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empiret vol. 
I 
61 
"Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers,  "Correspondence 
Belative to . . . Elgin's Special Missions . . .," Number 146 Enclosure 
1, Elgin to the Prime Minister of the Emperor of China, 24 April I858, 
in Elgin to Clarendon, 25 April 1858, 
6? 
"Ibid,j Number 155 Enclosure 5> Elgin to Seymour, 19 May 1858, 
in Elgin to Malm.esbury, 20 May 1858. 
6*? 
•"l-lorse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol. 
1» P. 519. ' ~ 
64 
Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers, "Correspondence 
Relative to , . . Elgin's Special Missions . . .Number 168 Enclosure 
1. Commissioners Xweiliang, Hwashana, and Kiying to the Earl of Elgin, 
11 June I858, in Elgin to Malmesbury, 14 June I858. 
65 , . n I old. 
66lbid., Number 181 Enclosure, Trea,ty between Her Majesty and the 
Emperor of China, in Elgin to Malmesbury, 12 July 1858. 
'r-i 
ibid,, Number 181, Elgin to Malmesbury, 12 July 1858. 
68 
Ft or s e, The International Relat ions of the Chinese Empire, vox t 
if P« 53̂ • 
69T, . -• Ibia.« 
r?0 
Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary PapersB "Correspondence 
Relative to . . . Elgin's Special Missions , , .Number 222 Enclosure, 
"Tariffs", 8 November I858, in Elgin to Malmesbury, 8 November I858, 
See Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol. 1, 
pp. 533-535 for a discussion of the tariff rules. 
71 Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers, "Correspondence 
Relative to , . . Elgin's Special Missions . . Number 171, 
Malmesbury to Elgin, 9 September 1858, 
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CHAPTER III 
THE COURSE TOWARD IOTEEl'ENTION 1860-1861 
While the Taiping Rebellion affected Sino-British relations far 
more strongly after 1859» the British maintained their precarious, 
flawed neutrality for another two years. Suspicion of the Manchu and 
Taiping policies placed them in the awkward position of "balancing the 
competing claims of the central government and the rebels. Although 
Sine—British relations slowly improved after ratification of the Treaty 
of Tientsin), the British followed a cautious policy toward the govern­
ment that had long resisted Western influence. As" the Taipings 
simultaneously reversed their foreign policy, the British viewed this 
change with little enthusiasm. It merely worsened their problem of 
maintaining neutrality while establishing better relations with the 
Imperial government. The anomalous position of the English in the 
civil war could not last indefinitely; both the Manchus and the Taipings 
acted to draw the British toward a course of Intervention, 
Although the Manchu court resisted treaty ratification, the 
British were committed to the central government through diplomacy and 
the hard-won treat3.es. The humiliation at Taku strengthened British 
resolve to exact the Manchus' compliance. To ensure success in humbling 
the Manchus, Bruce delayed his ultimatum to the Imperial government 
until he could act in concert with the French, and obtain adequate 
military assistance. Despite the Anglo-French alliance and the threat 
69 
of force, the Chinese refused to comply with Bruce's ultimatum. Foreign 
Secretary Russell had prepared Instructions for war against China. The 
naval and military "forces were to rendezvous in Hong Kong, an Anglo-
French occupation of Chusan was to be effectedj, grain junks to be 
stopped, and points on the Gulf of Pechili as the Admirals might desire 
1 
for Dases were to be seized and the Takoo forts attacked.." Russell 
also ordered a blockade of the Yangtze River and the coast north of it." 
In February, i860, Lord Elgin was reappointed as the special ambassador 
to Chins., completing British preparations for war0 It was not until 
June, however; that the English began their military campaign in China 
to achieve- treaty ratification. 
The Taiping Rebellion complicated the proposed mission to Peking. 
Under the guidance of Hung Jen-kan, Taiping Prime Minister, the insur­
rection regained enough ardor to threaten the dynasty. The English 
feared that excessively harsh, measures against the Manchus, coupled 
with the Taiping Rebellion, would precipitate the dynasty's fall and 
invite chaos in China. Russell expressed his concern over the problems 
that might arise from an allied assault on Peking. 
Abandoning his capital upon the advance of European troops, 
condemned, to admit the superiority of Fowers whom the Court of 
China, in its fatuity, has hitherto treated with contempt, the 
Emperor would suffer greatly in reputation. 
The rebels would take heart; the great officers of the Empire 
might find it difficult to maintain the central authority; the 
Governors of Provinces might hardly be able to quell Insurrection. 
, . The bonds of allegiance, once loosened, might never 
again be firmly united,,J 
As the rebellion entered its final and most intense phase, it increas­
ingly affected British policy toward the Manchus. 
In 1.559» Hung Jen-kan began to reorganize and revitalize the 
70 
dissipated Taiping movement. Pie revised Taiping theology and encouraged 
h 
bialical studies as part, of the civil service examination. While 
rationalizing Taiping Christianity, Hung Jen-kan "broadened rebel 
ideology to gain support from the Chinese scholar-gentry." He attempted 
to reorganize the rebel government, and suggested reforms for China's 
modernization.^ His program entailed a shift in the rebels' foreign 
policy. Willie the Heavenly King insisted upon exacting hommage from 
foreigners, Hung Jen-kan recognized the importance of national equality 
7 in diplomacy. To win support for the Taiplngs, Hung Jen-kan attempted 
to reverse the Heavenly King's policies. He cultivated the favor of 
missionaries and tried to open foreign relations with the Western 
Powers. His reforms were doomed to failure. The Chinese -scholar-gentry 
and Western officials were entrenched in their prejudice against the 
rebels. Hung Jen-kan's program nevertheless x*einvigorated the Taiping 
movement and renewed British interest in the rebel cause. The Taiplngs* 
emergence from Nanking, and their new foreign policy complicated the 
British position in the civil war. 
Desperate for- supplies, the Taiplngs began to move outward from 
Nanking, capturing Soochow, Hangchow, and Changchow. Their invasion 
cci.ncided with the opening of the silk season, a. period, in silk-culture 
that requires continuous labor. Consul Sinclair informed Bruce that 
"Much inconvenience is apprehended from this temporary and possibly 
g 
prolonged interruption to that trade." The Taiplngs' advance into 
Chekiang province began the ruin of China's silk trade and renewed 
British alarm fcr the safety of Shanghai. To protect the city, Chinese 
authorities requested foreign assistance. Bruce, having heard of the 
71 
rebels* destructiveness at Hangchow, agreed to defend Shanghai in concert 
with the Frencho He thought that 
without taking any part in this civil contest ... we might protect 
Shanghae from attack, and assist the authorities in preserving 
tranquillity within its walls, on the ground of its being a port 
open to trade, and of the intimate connection existing between the 
interests of the town and of the foreign, settlement. . . . We 
accordingly issued separate proclamations to that effect in 
identical terms. ... I have declined, all suggestions to extend 
the protection further than to the city itself.9 
Bruce's policy represented an unmeditated revival of Clarendon's plan 
to protect Shanghai in '1856, and constituted no dramatic break in 
British policy toward the rebels. British officials' primary con­
sideration was protection of their trade interests„ Bruce was confident 
that news of the Anglo-French protection of Shanghai would deter a rebel 
V 
assault, * but he underestimated the Taipings' determination to attack 
the city. 
Bruce knew that defense of Shanghai would place the allies in an 
anomalous position. At war with the Imperial government in the norths 
the British simultaneously would be defending its interests in the 
south, if the Taipings assaulted Shanghai. Bruce viewed the problem 
with trepidation as he realized that intervention in the civil war 
might endanger the Peking expeditions He refused "to intervene beyond 
the legitimate protection of foreign interests, without a previous 
statement of our differences with the Court, and a distinct under­
standing' with the Government as to the extent and nature of the assis-
12 
tance that is to be rendered." Bruce was concerned that England 
would lose prestige if the British appeared to serve the Imperial 
government in repulsing the Taipings. "No coarse could be so well 
calculated to lower our national reputation," he wrote, "as to lend 
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material support to a Government, the corruption of whose authorities 
13 is only checked by its weakness," The solution to this dilemma lay 
in regeneration of the Imperial government under British guidance. 
Until the Manchus were amenable to foreign Influence, however, the 
British avoided intervention. 
As the Imperial authorities and the Taiplngs beset them with 
diplomatic overtures, the British position in the civil war became 
increasingly difficult. The mandarins again requested Intervention, 
arguing that this would reassure the emperor of Britlslri friendliness 
toward China. Brace coolly responded that if the Chinese wanted 
assistance, they should immediately settle their differences with the 
English, and send their own troops from the north to the southern 
ill, 
provinces. He wished to avoid incurring responsibility for quelling 
the. rebellions and to conclude the Slno-British war* Under Hung Jen-
kan's Influence, the Taipings reversed their policy of non-Intercourse 
with foreigners, and renewed attempts at friendly diplomatic relations 
with the treaty powers. Bruce enjoined Consul Meadows against respond­
ing to Hung Jen-kan*s invitation to confer at Soochow, considering such 
action "inexpedient and objectionable on principle." He feared that 
if foreigners displayed sympathy for the rebel cause, they would 
16 
encourage the Taipings to approach Shanghai.,' He notified the rebels 
that the Anglo-French forces were instructed to hold the city in a 
military occupation. Defense of Shanghai would constitute "a purely 
military measure, whereas any declaration .. . . would be neither quite 
consistent with the state of . . . our diplomatic functions at present 
. , . nor could it be framed to avoid, some . . . opinion on the desire 
73 
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the Insurgents have manifested to enter into relations with us," 
While diplomatic and strategic considerations prevented Bruce from 
openly rejecting the rebels' offer of friendly intercourse, he expressed 
contempt for their religion, leadership, and policies. "The prospects 
of the extension of pure Christianity . . . and the success of the 
insurrection . . . have suffered materially from the religious character 
r . . /Hung Hsiu-ch'uan's/ leadership has imparted to it.'f The 
Taipings' religious dogma, Bruce observed, deprived them of support 
among the Chinese, transferring "to the Tartars . . . the prestige of 
upholding traditions and principles against the assaults of a numeri-
19 
eally insignificant sect." He deplored the inability of the Taiping 
leaders to organize a system of government in their captured cities.^ 
The Taipings' destructiveness increasingly conflicted with British trade 
interests, which depended upon security of property, Bruce dismissed 
Hung Jen-kan's reform of Taiping administration. "Every day shows more 
strongly that no principles or ideas of policy animate . . . /the rebel/ 
leaders. Even the extermination of the Tartars , . . seems rather a 
pretext for upsetting all government and authority . . . than ... a 
21 
step toward establishing a , . . national government." Like £owring, 
Bruce considered the Taipings incapa/ble of ruling China. As he feared 
that the rebels' occupation of Shanghai would ruin trade., Bruce was 
"little inclined, to attach weight to their assurances of respecting 
foreign persons or property or to allow them if it can be helped to 
obtain possession of the city.""' Although they wished to avoid con­
flict with the Taipings, the British were prepared to defend their 
trade intere sts. 
On 19 August, the rebels assaulted Shanghai. British and Indian 
troops repulsed them. After three days of fighting, the Taipings with­
draw, In his despatch to Russell, Bruce explained that "some persons 
advocated taking the offensive against the Insurgents, but the Commander 
. . « considering the smallness of our forces, the season, and the 
danger of insurrection in the city, decided on maintaining a strictly 
defensive attitude. Politically speaking . . . this was the . . . 
course .. . » least calculated, to fetter the proceedings of the Ambas-
23 sadors in the North." The French and British assumed a military 
2b 
occupation of Snanghai, warning the rebels against further assaults. 
While Bruce had no wish to disturb Sino-British relations at Peking, he 
proposed to take offensive measures against the rebels if they renewed 
25 attacks on Shanghai. Upon receiving requests for assistance against 
the rebels, however, he cautiously declined to extend British protection 
beyond the city. Lord Russell entirely .approved Bruce's conduct 
27 toward the rebels. In view of the anomalous situation with the 
Imperial government and the Taipings* retreat from Shanghai, Bruce 
adhered to the policy of protecting British trade, although it involved 
serving the Manchus* interests. 
V.liile the British prepared to defend Shanghai, they began their 
campaign agaiiist the Imperial government. Bruce declined to blockade 
% 
the Gulf of Chihli, considering the seizure of grain-junks detrimental 
to trade. Russell agreed that "the more the pressure is put upon the 
Gov/ernmen/t of China, and the less it is made to bear on those engaged 
28 
in trade (provided the object is attained) the better." Early in the 
year the allies had occupied Chusan, and in June, they hastened, final 
preparations for war. In August, the Anglo-French forces landed at 
Pehtang and prepared to assault the Taku forts. On the same day that 
the British repulsed the Taipings in the south, the Taku forts fell. 
Strained Anglo-French relations, and the anomalous defense of Shanghai, 
led the allies to seek a speedy resolution of the China problem. They 
prepared a draft convention to be settled at Tungchow. Treaty ratifi­
cations were to be exchanged at Peking. The Chinese, however, objected 
"to three points in the proposed arrangements! the indefiniteness in 
the date of withdrawing the /allied/ troops, Lord Elgin's intention of 
taking to Peking the full escort which he would take to Tungchow, and 
the delivery of the queen's letter to the emperor at an audience. They 
pQ 
chiefly insisted on their objection to the last."Diplomacy might 
have settled these issues, but the Chinese committed a gross error. 
Indifferent to their flag of truce, the Chinese captured the British 
delegate l£r. Parkes and several others, wrongly assuming that Parkes 
possessed diplomatic authority, and could halt the allied advance on 
30 
Peking. This action enraged Elgin, and seriously impaired Sine-
British relations. 
Prince Eung, brother of the emperor, insisted upon retaining the 
hostages until the allied forces withdrew and peace negotiations began. 
While French forces sacked the Imperial1, summer palace, Elgin threatened 
to take Peking if the prisoners were not released. Under persistent 
military threat, the Chinese? surrendered the Anting gate of Peking. 
"So peaceable a solution was welcome to the higher officers in the 
allied camp, who realised that, with the means c.t their disposal, it 
31 was no slight task to breach the mighty walls of the Chinese capital." 
76 
The Chinese had killed several of their captives, hut Parkes and twelve 
others were released. ELgin ordered the burning of the summer palace 
in retaliation for the Chinese insult. His action was calculated to 
reassert British prestige. He "had reason . . , to believe that it was 
an act -which . . . /would/ produce a greater effect in China, and on the 
Emperor, than persons who look on from a distance may suppose. It was 
the Emperor*s favorite residence," Elgin explained, "and its destruction 
32 
could not fail to be a blow to his pride. . . . Humiliated and 
defeated, the Imperial government ratified the British Treaty of 
Tientsin on Zk October I860. On the same day, Chinese authorities 
signed the Convention of Peking, by which they apologised for the Taku 
incident, and agreed to pay a large indemnity to the British. ICowloori 
Point was ceded to the British crown and Tientsin was opened to tra.de. 
British occupation of Taku, Canton, Shantung, and Tientsin would 
continue until the indemnities were paid. By undermining the dynas­
ty's sovereignty, the British achieved their long-sought diplomatic and 
trade concessions. 
Prior to ratificat5.cn of the Treaty of Tientsin, the emperor fled 
to Jehol with the court war-faction. The British had long-anticipated 
his flight b, and. feared the dynasty would, collapse under such humiliating 
circuastances. The emperor*s flight, however, eased Sino-British 
relations. It "served to maintain tho new political equilibrium in, 
which the peace party was now able to have a decisive voice. . . . The 
ad hoc machinery for peace negotiations under Prince Kung was . » . in-
Oh. 
stitutio;ialised as a formal standing organ for foreign affairs."-̂  The 
f.sungli Yamem, or the Office of General Administration, placed 
Sino-British relations on terms of diplomatic equality0 Establishment 
of the Tsungli Yamen in 1861 did not dispel the court's anti-foreignism 
nor did it complete the Imperial government's adaptation of Western 
modes of diplomacy. Yet it created "an institutional change in « « « 
/China's/ conduct of foreign affairs, ending the traditional principle 
of inequality between the Chinese empire and all other states, which 
35 had been institutionalized in the tribute system." Prince Kung's 
diplomacy slowly improved Sino-British relations. 
In I860, there was no agreement between Manchu and British offi­
cials to subdue the Taiping Rebellion, The British preferred to place 
the responsibility of tranquilizing China upon the Imperial government. 
In a meeting with Prince Kungs Bruce "urged upon him the necessity of 
immediate steps being taken to restore the authority of the Imperial 
Government . . , and represented to him that he was misled in supposing 
that our interest would lead us to hold Shanghae for the Imperial-
ists,, » . While they wished to protect their trade, the British 
were reluctant to incur expensive military obligations in China, The 
emperor's war-faction at Jehol represented a continued-resistance to 
European influence, which Bruce resented. The British remained in 
their anomalous position of defending the interests of a hostile govern 
merit "against the insurgents whose professions and declarations - at. all 
» 37 
events were couched in a friendly spirit." In his earlier correspon­
dences Bruce had expressed disgust with the rebels* He used an oblique 
threat of favoring the rebel cause as a means of exacting the Manchus' 
cooperation. Anxious to draw the Manchus into Western diplomacy, Bruce 
suggested that they establish an ambassador in England "as a pledge 
78 
of . . . /their/ intention ... to conduct their foreign relations in 
">•8 
a different spirit,British reluctance to intervene, coupled with 
their suspicion of the Manchus' policies prevented Sino-British coopera­
tion against the Taipings. 
Although British concern for the security of trade intensified in 
1861, they remained uncommitted to a policy of direct intervention 
against the Taipings, The defense of Shanghai was an embarrassing 
compromise of British neutrality. The English, however, justified 
their action as a defense of their interests, and affected neutrality 
elsewhere In the civil war. Bruce insisted upon protecting Shanghai, 
"until the Insurgents have sufficiently established their superiority 
to enable us to consider the contest as respects that part of China at 
'jq 
an end.With Russell's approval., Consul Meadows rejected the French 
40 
propose.! to extend the radius of military protection at Shanghai. 
sJhen the Taipings threatened the treaty port of Ningpo, Bruce enjoined 
Consul Sinclair from extending British protection to the city. He 
instructed Sinclair "to take such measures as may appear expedient 
• . . for the security of foreigners. Your language should be that we 
take no part in this civil contest,—but that we claim exemption from 
Zj-i 
Injury and arrogance at the hands of both parties. . . ." Russell 
t-2 
approved Bruce11 s policy. ' With the exception of Shanghai, Clarendon's 
earlier instructions on defense of the port cities remained in abeyance. 
i-Jhile there -;?as no distinct break in their policy toward the Taipings, 
It "became increasingly difficult for the British to separate their 
interests from those of the Manchus, which led, them closer to direct 
intervention. 
79 
The Taiping Rebellion continued to disrupt trade, forcing the 
English into contact with the rebels tc ensure security of their 
interests. Although supplies of sillt remained constant, the import 
/.n 
trade considerably slackened, - The rebels capture of Soochow "ren­
dered it most desirable to find an uninterrupted channel of communication 
kk 
with the Western Provinces of China,." Bruce therefore proposed that 
the Yangtze be opened to trade, all.though this was contrary to provisions 
of the Treaty of Tientsin, Prince Kung assented. In February, 1861., 
Admiral Hope undertook his first expedition up the Yangtze to meet with 
the Taiplngs. 
The rebels agreed not to attack Shanghai for one year, and allowed 
British traders access tc Hankow and Kiukiang. The British pledged 
h 5 
their neutrality. Nevertheless, the conference confirmed the official 
British view of the Taipings5 aversion to commerce, "They don't in any 
way encourage trade, excepting in fire-arms and gunpowder. These, as 
well as steamers, they are anxious to buy. They pretend, a willingness 
to facilitate trade . . . but . . . these soft speeches were merely to 
if-6 
gain cn.tr goodwill." Absorbed in war with the Manchus, the Taipings 
paid attention to trade only to avert .English hostility. Their 
d.estructiveness appall.ed the British. "They are too ignorant to conduct 
war on scientific principles, and. /to/" aim at becoming masters of the 
country with the least possible Injury to the great centres of 
trade, . , . Experience shows us that the insurgents in taking posses-
s.ion of a commercial city ruin it as an emporium of trade." ' Although 
Bruce was adverse to diplomatic relations with the Taipings, expansion 
of British interests necessitated limited intercourse with them. He 
simultaneously wished to exempt the treaty ports from attack, and tc 
avoid endangering Sino-British relations by appearing too friendly 
48 
toward the Taipings. Bruce was in a most awkward situation, to which 
the home government offered no immediate solution. 
"While awaiting developments in the civil war, Russell avoided the 
appearance of collusion with the Manchus.. He instructed Bruce to enjoir 
the Chinese authorities against further payment of British troops at 
Shanghai. "This arrangement may lead to misapprehension and may induce 
the Imperialists to suppose that we are prepared to quit CUT1 neutral 
bn 
position and. take part with them in the Civil War." In July, Russell 
instructed Bruce to establish the neutrality of the treaty ports, and 
to refrain from using force against the Taipings except to protect 
50 
British subjects and property. In September, he suggested that "it 
might be expedient to defend the Treaty Ports if the Chinese would 
51 
consent not to use those Ports for purposes of aggression." Russell's 
proposal to exclude the Chinese from direct involvement in defense of 
the treaty ports nevertheless compromised the British in favor of 
Manchu interests. Resolution of this chronic dilemma lay in the unifi­
cation of Chinese and British interests, which began under Prince 
Kung5 s influence. 
The emperor's death at Jehol in August, 1861, initiated a power 
struggle between the war-faction of Prince I and the peace-faction of 
Prince ~K\uig, with the emperor's concubine Yehonala, Prince Kung 
achieved a coup d'etat, establishing her as Empress Dowager, a title 
she shared with the emperor's consort. Yehonala assumed the name Tis'u-
hsi, and ruled in the stead of her young son, T'ung-chih. To retain 
her power, Ts'u-hsi reversed her anti-foreign stance to accord with 
Prince Kung's policy of conciliation. Tz'u-hsi alone could not have 
enabled Prince Kung to achieve the coup d'etat or unification of the 
Grand Councj.l and the Tsungli Yamen. "Had there not been Western 
support for the conciliatory conduct of foreign affairs by Prince Kung 
and his associates, they might not have dared to take bold measures. 
They would also have found if difficult to stabilize the political 
52 
situation after the coup d'etat."" The Imperial government increas­
ingly depended upon the treaty powers to maintain its authority. 
Although the British avoided assuming direct political control in China, 
their interest in trade compelled them to develop closer ties with the 
Imperial government. With Prince Kung as the arbitor of foreign policy, 
the 'tension inherent in Sino-British relations gradually diminished. 
Foreign legations were established at Peking in March, 1861, 
facilitating diplomatic intercourse with the Chinese. The Imperial 
authorities accepted extension of the Foreign Inspectorate system to 
the treaty ports. By 186l, the Inspectorate was established at Canton, 
Shanghai,- Swatow, Chinkiang, Ningpo, Foochow, Kiukiang, and Hankow. In 
subsequent years other ports were provided with Foreign Inspectorates,"̂  
Sino-British relations greatly improved through the influence of Robert 
Hart, director of the Foreign Inspectorate. Hart supported the Tsungli 
Yamen and advised Prince Kung on political matters. Under his manage­
ment, the Foreign Inspectorate system provided the Imperial government 
with the revenue necessary to consolidate its authority. Indirect 
54 
assistance to the government perfectly fitted with British interests. 
English trade interests required establishment of peace and 
regular government throughout China. The Tsungli Yamen represented a 
considerable improvement in Chinese foreign relations, which strength­
ened the government's domestic situation. Yet the Taiping Rebellion 
continued to undermine the dynasty's authority. To consolidate the 
government, the Taiping Rebellion had to- be quelled. '"I do not think 
that order , „ . can be permanently restored," Bruce wrote, "unless the 
Imperial Government, regains it's /sic/ prestige among the people by some 
proof of it's vigour and power as would be afforded by it's successful 
55 action against the Insurgents, Bruce wanted no part in directly 
56 
assisting the dynasty. Nevertheless the government's military weak­
ness was evident. "Neither in equipment nor In organization are their 
troops better than the banditti and rabble who . . . set the Imperial 
57 Authority at defiance." The incompetence of the Manchu forces 
resulted in difficulties for British traders-. The Taipings held, the 
silk districts and levied duties on silk brought into their territory. 
British merchants complained that duty payment afforded them no pro-
58 
tection, nor did it exempt them fx*om further duties en route. While 
the British avoided military commitments to the Manchus, It became 
.Increasingly clear that the government could neither subdue the 
rebellion with its own resources, nor afford adequate protection to 
British trade. 
In December, 1861, the Taipings captured Ningpo. The British, 
took nc immediate action against them, but waited to ascertain if they 
would establish a government and allow trade. Consul Harvey's reports, 
although biased and inaccurate, confirmed the official British view of 
59 
ifte rebels' destructiveness and failure to govern. After a second 
83 
trip to Nanking in December, Admiral Hope received no promise from the 
Taipings to abstain from attacking the treaty ports or disrupting 
British trade on the Yangtze River,^ Hung Jen-kan's policy of conci­
liation toward Westerners fell into disrepute, and he was demoted. As 
6l 
the autonomous Taiping commanders ignored Hung Jen-kan*s policies, 
their military campaigns brought them closer to collision with the 
British,. At the end of 1861, the British verged on intervention. 
While the British gradually became reconciled to the Imperial 
government after ratification of the Treaty of Tientsin, essentially 
they maintained their established policy toward the Taipings, Indemni­
ties and the treaty bound the English closer to the central government, 
but they avoided displaying their anxiety about the dynasty's future if 
rebellion continued,, Their cautious policy enabled the British, to evade 
significant military commitments to the dynasty, while they awaited a 
change in the Manchus® foreign, policy. Although the coup d'gtat and 
reforms of Prince Kung greatly improved Sino-British relations, the 
British avoided intervention, as they feared an anti-foreign reaction, 
among the Imperial authorities. The Taipings' conduct forced the 
British to assume greater responsibility for defense of the dynasty's 
interests. The rebels' antagonism and the Manchus' conciliation led 
the British to favor the Imperia-l cause, in spite of the defects they 
observed in the central government. 
The defense of Shanghai in I860 was not a turning point in British 
policy. The primary considerations of British officials continued to 
be protection of the foreign settlements and their trade interests.^ 
British neutrality had been imperfect fcr several years, but defense of 
Shanghai, marked, a greater bias in favor of the Imperial cause. Although 
the Shanghai crisis constituted another step toward intervention, it 
was a local solution to a local problem. Only when the Taipings* 
l'epeated threats tc British trade became intolerable, and the Manchus 
showed themselves amenable to European influence in their armies, did 
the British directly assist the Imperial government. 
FOOTNOTES 
j 
Costin, Great Britain and China, p. yjQ. 
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CHAPTER IV 
lOTERVEOTl'ON AM) REFORM 1862-1864 
In 1862,. the British openly became partisans of the Imperial 
cause, considering an alliance with the central, government the best 
means of advancing their tra.de interests. Confirmed in their view that 
rebellion was inimical to trade, the British hesitantly adopted a course 
of Intervention. British officials attempted to place responsibility 
for subduing the rebellion upon the central government. Although regen­
eration of the Imperial government enabled the dynasty to regain its. 
sovereignty9 primarily it served British Free Trade Interests, 
The Taipings appeared unable to govern or guarantee the safety of 
trade. British interests rested upon security of property, which the 
Taipings did not afford. "We cannot look upon the advance of the 
Insurgents with any feeling but that of regret," Bruce wrote, "as long 
as their conduct to the native population is such that every respectable 
Chinaman flies from the places occupied by them, and declines to put 
1 
his person and property within their power," While occupying Ningpo, 
the Taipings threatened Shanghai, despite their agreement to avoid 
attacking the city. They assured the treaty powers they would respect 
foreign settlements, but insisted that occupation of the Chinese city 
2 
was vital to their cause. The British had long considered the city of 
Shanghai an integral part of their trade interest; thejr were most 
anxious to maintain its security. The rebels' promises to them 
increasingly met with disbelief. 
As Shanghai's vulnerability increased, British alarm intensified. 
The rebels stopped the flow of supplies into the city* and Bruce feared 
that "the insurgents will be emboldened by cur pass.ivo.ness and their 
success at Ningpo, to press us still closer. ... In ray opinion," he 
stated, "we are perfectly justified in taking the offensive against the 
insurgents . . . provided we can deal such a blow as is likely to keep 
3 4 them at a respectable distance." Russell concurred. In February, 
Admiral Hope had provided naval support to the Imperial authorities at 
Shanghai. At the end of April, British, French, and Chinese forces 
combined to clear the rebels from a thirty-mile radius around Shanghai. 
Bruce insisted that the Chinese take defensive measures to protect 
Ehaxighai f:com subsequent attacks.^ To avoid rendering large amounts of 
military aid to the government; Bruce urged the Chinese to assume an 
Much responsibility as "possible in the civil war. He was reluctant to 
go beyond protection of Shanghai, and Russell approved his conduct.1" 
In Kayj British and French naval forces bombarded Ningpo, routing the 
Taipings and delivering the city to the Imperialists.- The home govern-
meat approved the taking of Ningpo.! Russell had lost patience with th 
rebels,. "The Taepings," he wrote, "are incapable of establishing a 
regular authority., or of giving protection to peaceable inhabitants of 
the country they over-run with their savage hord.es, . . . Her Majesty' 
Government therefore consider it a duty . . . tc favour the restoration 
r> 
J" 1 t.O oi order. 
British officials, particularly Lord. Bruce, sought a limited 
engagement against the Taipings, based upon protection of British 
90 
interests, Russell instructed Bruce to ensure defense of" the treatjr 
ports, adding that "British commerce should have the aid of Her Majesty's 
o 
Slips of War.'!' More cautious than Russell, Bruce was troubled "by the 
obvious bias in favor of the Manchus which defense of the ports 
entailed, 
If the Ports are only to be neutral in this sense,—that they are 
not to be attacked, and that the Imperialists are not to make them 
the base of operations, but . . . may continue to use the resources 
to be derived from the possession of these towns ... it is clear 
that they would be gainers by the arrangements and that we would be 
open to the charge of unfairness, in proposing, under the mask of 
neutrality, an arrangement decidedly advantageous to one Party.^0 
Bruce apparently considered the thirty-mile radius of Shanghai a purely 
defensive measure serving only British interests, and saw no evidence 
of "bias in that expedient. The offensive action later taken at Ningpo 
confirmed the British in a course of intervention, which Bruce reluc­
tantly endorsed, Russell adopted a simple, pragmatic policy. ''The 
only rational course," he wrote> "is to defend our own trade, to protect 
the Treaty Ports, and to encourage the Chinese Gov/ernmen/t to arm a 
H 
sufficient force . . , to dislodge and rout the Rebels." " It neces­
sitated increased diplomatic and military commitments to the central 
government, however, to prod the Chinese into action against the 
Taipings» 
The British approved Prince Kung's initial reforms, and became 
more confident of the government's ability to subdue the rebellion. 
Bruce wished the authorit5.es to continue their reforms to strengthen 
the government. "If the Imperial Government can be induced, to enter 
boldly on the path of military and financial reform," he wrote, "it 
will be successful In crushing the existing anarchy which has its' /sic7 
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origin in its'' weakness even more than its' corruption." Bruce®s 
policy was calculated to lessen the problems of foreign governments 
dealing with Chinese authorities. It was not humane, but pragmatic. 
The British strongly desired to avoid "another India." It was easier 
and less costly to encourage native authorities to govern upon European 
principles than to rule in their stead. Bruce welcomed the opportunity 
to assist in. Westernizing the Imperial government. He was satisfied 
with his progress in convincing the authorities of "the advantages to 
be derived from the adoption of European improvements . . . for, sincere 
conviction on these points is the only security against reaction, should 
this Government recover strength enough to suppress anarchy in 
4 O 
China. ... In short, improvement must be adopted, not imposed." 
The British sought to lead the Chinese toward 'what they considered a 
"better system of government, and in doing so, to advance their interests. 
To complete the regeneration of the central government and to 
protect British trade, it became necessary to reform the Ch'ing military 
system. The British had long held the Chinese army In contempt. Brace 
deplored the provincial military system, which prevented concerted 
In­
action against the Taipings.J"' The Imperial government, however, was 
una ale to manage the system of local forces under the gentry, who 
15 controlled a large part of military spending through the likin tax. 
''The decline in civil and military power of the central government was 
of necessity "balanced by the establishment of local forces. Prince 
Kung had little choice bat to adopt the policy of military decentrali-
j 7 
aation, which the war-faction had previously advocated.. Bruce sought 
to reverse the tread toward decentralization as a means of strengthening 
the centra.1 government, and improving Sino-British relations, "The 
Chinese Government should create an Imperial, force . . . a.nd , , . we 
should boldly abandon the traditions of our past intercourse, which 
have led the consuls to . . . weaken . . . the authority of the Chinese 
Executive, and to look upon our position at the Ports, as being depen-
i.8 
dent, for its security, on the helplessness of the . . . Government. 
Tc avoid an "Eastern Question" in China and to protect British trade 
against the Taipings, Bruce advocated instructing the Chinese forces in 
Western military techniques. 
Bruce requested Brigadier--General Staveley bo assist the Chinese 
i 9 
in organizing their forces." Unless the Chinese had proper military 
equipment their training was useless. To avoid large military commit­
ments to the central government, Eruce considered it necessary to arm 
the Chinese forces. In his despatch to Russell, he reported that- "Tseng 
Ivwo-fan /sic/ . . . had expressed opinions similar to mine,—that . „ . 
it was necessary to obtain foreign arms, and to use foreign instruction, 
20 
though not foreign troops. . . Tseng had. gathered a considerable 
military force raider his command, uniting his officers- by an appeal to 
Confucianism. He paid Ms troops well and regularly. His force tran­
scended the limits of a local militia and constituted a strong regional 
PA 
army, '* Tseng's desire to limit foreign aid to instruction and weapons 
% 
was not based upon a desire for personal aggrandizement; he dreaded the 
consequences of allowing foreign troops into China, Tseng feared, that 
"unless . , , foreign soldiers were inclined to virtue they might 
become a danger within the state, not content after the war to disband 
quietly , . . but insisting cn staying to seize a share in China's 
93 
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inheritance." Although motivated by different reasons, Tseng and 
Bruce agreed that foreign assistance to the dynasty should remain 
limited, permitting the Chinese to assume greater responsibility in 
subduing the rebellion. 
The British willingly provided the Chinese with material assis-
tance. In March, 1862, Robert Kart instructed Mr. Lay to purchase, 
staff', and equip a war flotilla for the Imperial government. Lay's 
mission posed the difficulty of allowing British subjects to enter the 
emperor's service. The Admiralty pragmatically asserted that the 
prohibition against Englishmen entering the emperor's service "has 
already been virtually abrogated by the recent instructions to British 
23 
authorities in China. . . ." With the sanction of the British govern­
ment, Lay completed his mission in late 1862, and selected Captain 
Sierard Osborn as assistant commander-in-chief. In 1863, the Lay-Osborn 
flotilla arrived in China. Osborn refused to serve the provincial 
authorities, Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang. He would serve only the 
emperor. The Imperial authorities could not sanction the independence 
that Osborn demanded, nor could they permit such a gross insult to Tseng 
and Li. Osborn quickly dissolved the fleet, infuriating the Chinese 
2)\-
and rendering their1 expenditure fruitless. Lay was dismissed. The 
Lay-Osborn flotilla represented an abortive attempt at cooperation 
between Chinese and British authorities. If the British were to succeed 
in assisting the central government, they had to consider the Chinese 
military structure, adapting themselves to Chinese institutions while 
serving their interests. 
The work of reforming the Chinese army proceeded slowly. Anxious 
94 
to maintain control of their forces, the Chinese preferred to adopt 
only European weapons. Bruce realized the difficulty of reorganization, 
and contented himself with rudimentary changes. He did not abandon, the 
idea of reform, "bat advocated a policy of gradualism. "Good fire arms, 
with artillery, and a squadron of gunboats would give the Imperialists, 
even organized as they are, a great superiority over the insurgents," 
he wrote, "My efforts at present are directed to induce the Government 
to adopt these improvements, and to organise the garrisons of the Ports 
? 5 26 
. . j on the European plan," Russell approved Bruce's policy, As 
late as Hovei«ibcxrc 1862, Russell declined to sanction general British 
intervention. He cautioned Bruce to "distinguish those cases in . . . 
•which we have a. right and an obligation from those in which we have 
neither. You will call upon Her Majesty's Naval and. Military forces to 
protect the Treaty Ports, but not to take part in the operatione of war 
p r y  
at places distant from those Porto.""' Like Bruce, Russell wished the 
Chinese to take the initiative in the war against the Taipings. 
Russells however, remained concerned for the safety of British 
trade, particularly at Shanghai. The Taipings* "habits of pillage and. 
murder," he said, "would soon put an end to the trade of that city, and 
pg 
make cur Treaty rights null and void for any practical purpose."-
After receiving reports that large supplies of munitions were 'being sold 
to the rebels, ' Russell sanctioned a regulation forbidding British 
subjects to sell weapons to them.^ This measure, and assistance to the 
Imperial government failed, to allay Russell's concern for British trade. 
In January, 1863, the home government issued Orders in Council sanc­
tioning employment of British officers in the emperor's service from 
O K  s 
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16 Dec ember 1862 through 1 September 186'+, While the .British had. no 
intention of abandoning reform of the Chinese troops, the use of foreign 
officers was calculated to hasten the Taipings' defeat. 
The decision to permit foreign officers to join the emperor's 
service was both an acquiescence to a, long-standing situation in the 
civil war and a logical culmination of British policy. The American 
adventurer FTedrick Townsend Ward initially served the Chinese in an 
unofficial capacity, With a small force of mercenaries, he recaptured 
Sungkiang in I860 for a group of local merchants. In 1861, "he substi­
tuted . . . a gradually increasing body of Chinese troops, drilled and 
32 officered by foreigners. . . . Bruce considered it impossible to 
prevent foreigners from entering the Imperialists' ranks if the Chinese 
33 • were willing to employ them, In 1861, Busaell had considered permit-
3'+ 
'ting British subjects to enter a foreign legion under the emperor, -
but this plan remained in abeyance until 1862. when the British became 
convinced of the necessity and. viability of intervention. 
Ward's force assisted the British against the Taipings at Nankiao 
and K&oklao early in 1862, and henceforth was known as the "Ever-
Victorious Army." While the British sold munitions at cost to Ward* s 
army, Russell instructed Bruce to press upon Prince Xung "the expedi­
ency of the Chinese Government sparing no pains to raise the force under 
Colonel Ward to ten thousand, and. to furnish him with the means of 
35 equipping them for the field." It was not merely Ward's success nor 
the Taipings' threat to British interests that led the British to favor 
the Ever-Victorious Army. Ward did.much toward disciplining the Chinese 
troops. By assisting in army reform, he indirectly served the British 
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without subjecting them to unwanted responsibility. The Imperial 
governments s policy of cooperation and invigoration of the army con­
vinced the British that reform in China was practicable. Ward's force 
and Tseng Kuo-fan's resistance to using foreign troops perfectly fitted. 
British desire to assist the government without incurring the expense 
of sending a J.arge number of troops to China,. In September, 1862, Ward 
was killed in action. His death created discipline problems in the 
Ever-Victorious Array, and necessitated a search for a new coiiiaander. 
Through Admiral Hope's recommendation, the American Henry 
Burgevine assumed command of the Ever-Victorious Army. While he was a 
capable leader, Burgevine was tactless and distrusted, by Chinese 
officers. The British, however, cooperated with' him to secure the 
army's continuation. Admiral Hops "felt that it was absolutely neces­
sary to give him some assistance with officers, until he shall have had 
time to procure them, if it be desired to prevent the entire disorgani-
aaticn of the corps."- Hope's efforts were useless. Burgevine 
quarrelled with his paymaster, and his relations with the Chinese 
officers steadily worsened, Burgevine was dismissed and eventually 
defected to the Taipings, An English officer, Captain Holland, replaced 
bim. With an Englishman in command and. their pay in arrear s, th e 
American officers became quarrelsome< A threatened mutiny was averted 
by payment of the troops, but the Ever-Victorious Army increasingly was 
a source of friction between Chinese and foreigners. Resolved to 
protect the:ir interests, the British nevertheless committed themselves 
to assist the government by licensing officers to join the emperor's 
service. 
Throughout 1863s, administrative problems of intervention plagued 
British officials, who slowly realized the magnitude of their task. 
Obstacles to reorganizing the Chinese army made Bruce despair of 
achieving a. strong, centralized force. The British experienced consid­
erable difficulty in defining the role of officers in the Chinese 
forces, which were unused to foreign discipline and methods of warfare. 
In this phase of adjustment, the tenuous Sino-British alliance began to 
weaken,, revealing the fundamental discontinuity between Chinese and 
British interests. 
"The object to be effected.," Bruce wrote, "is the substitution of 
an improved military and na,val organization for the one hitherto used 
in China. I need not point out the impossibility of doing this 
37 suddenly.'" Reformation of the Chinese military, he noted, entailed 
great expense to the central government, which simultaneously was paying 
38 
war-indemnities to France and Britain, The British exacted a heavy 
price for protection of Free Trade in China, Indemnities and reform 
placed a considerable financial burden on the Imperial government. 
Payment of indemnities weakened the government that the British ardently 
desired to regenerate through expensive reforms. Yet they did not see 
a contradiction in their policy. Inconsistencies were overridden by an 
appeal to the cause of Free Trade-, which Victorians regarded as a,..,boon 
to Chinese civilization. 
Anxious to impress the Chinese with the necessity of reform, Bruce 
tactlessly denegrated the Imperial forces. The Chinese contingents, he 
said, "cannot face the rebels, and are invariably defeated, unless 
supported by Foreign troops, or by Chinese disciplined by foreign 
39 
officers,."'" Sincere in his-desire to reform the Chinese military 
system, Bruce because irritated as the government failed to accept his 
recommendations. At the end of the civil war, he predicted, "the 
foreign officers will be dismissed; and the Chinese Force will revert 
to its old condition of large numbers of men badly paid, badly led and 
insufficiently equipped, and only fit to increase the pillage and 
l\0 
anarchy which they are unable to put down." Consul Robertson was 
equally discouraged by the problems of training Chinese troops in 
European drill. Despite his irritation at the slowness of reform, 
Bruce preferred to continue the program of instruction for Chinese 
Lip 
troops, rather than assemble forces under foreign commanders. ~ While 
Russell concurred with Bruce, he regarded the use. of foreign officers 
as a temporary but necessary expedient. He informed Bruce that the use 
of foreign commanders "must be continued for the present and till 
Shanghai is free from all danger of capture, but as a permanent system 
ll/er/ M/ajesiv/'s Gcv/ernmen/t would much prefer that the Imperial 
Gov/emmen/1 would be placed in a condition to defend its territories 
43 
by means of Chinese Officers a.nd Soldiers. " 
While training Chinese soldiers in European warfare, the English 
became more involved with the Ever-Victorious Army. With the queen's 
license, and. at half-pay, British officers were permitted to serve 
44 
beyond the thirty-mile radius of Shanghai* In March, I803, Major 
Charles "Chinese" Gordon assumed command of the Ever-*Victorious Army. 
Captain Holland's brief tenure had been fraught with defeats and 
blunders, but Gordon was an unwelcome replacement, "The force was 
sulky and mutinous, and did not wish an English officer; but . . . 
99 
/Gordon/ informed the officers , . . that they need not fear sweeping 
changes or injury to their prospects; and they remained in their 
45 
duty." He quickly won their respect through successful campaigns 
against the Taipings. 
Affiliation of English officers with the Chinese army created 
unforeseen problems for Lord Bruce, the home government, and the com­
manders themselves. Eruce disavowed any responsibility for the actions 
of British officers who served beyond the thirty-mile radius, and 
wished to maintain strict control over the officers training Chinese 
troops. "Officers lent to discipline the Chinese . . . can only serve 
for the protection of Shanghai, and the radius, and in improving the 
46 
military organization of the Chinese." Russell disagreed. To support 
his view, he mentioned that adequate control existed over all British 
officers in China; the home government could simply recall "an imprudent 
47 
or ambitious Officer." Bruce's policy rested upon a strong desire 
to reform the Chinese troops, and to keep intervention to an absolute 
minimum. The home government's policy ostensibly accorded with Bruce's, 
but Russell favored any measure designed to quell the rebellion, while 
Bruce insisted upon the more far-reaching policy of reform. As the 
rebellion intensified and the Taipings fought more desperately, foreign 
intervention became a greater interest to the home government than 
Eruce's cautious policy of reform. 
Unusual difficulties with the Chinese forces disrupted Sino-
British cooperation. The Imperialists showed no mercy to captured 
Taipings.- To Tseng Kuo-fan, "these rebels . . . added to their rebel­
lion against the Throne blasphemy . . . and disdain for the orthodox 
100 
faith of the fathers; they were outside the pale of humanity, they were 
48 
a poison in the "body politic that- must be utterly eradicated." The 
Imperialists' cruelty to the Taipings appalled the British. In 1862, 
Russell had instructed Bruce to "impress on Prince Kung that if he 
sanctions cruel and indiscriminate punishments he will entirely lose 
49 
the support of the British Authorities." Bruce remonstrated the 
Imperialists, but did not fulfill Russell's threat of withdrawing 
50 
British support. Atrocities against the Taipings continued, and 
later would have important repercussions for Sino-Briiish relations. 
Gordon experienced problems with the Ever-Victorious Army. As funds 
for the troops frequently were in arrears, the army locted captured 
cities as a guarantee of payment, The force mutinied over a proposed 
transfer of its headquarters, enraging Gordon. "He was willing to 
placate his men, as long as they behaved themselves; but unmilitary 
conduct, a mutinous spirit4 and the subordination of a soldier's first 
duty—fighting—to private interests—loot—were things he would not 
51 si-and. After disputing with a Chinese general, Gordon submitted his 
resignation, but was persuaded to rescind it. Difficulties between the 
Chinese and British, however, merely multiplied. 
Despite Gordon's problems with the Ever-Victorious Army, the home 
government continued to rely upon it, placing little faith in the 
ability of Chinese troops to safeguard British interests at Shanghai. 
Although Major-General Brown proposed to withdraw his force from 
Shanghai, complaining that the city was insalubrious, the home govern­
ment strongly resisted his suggestion. "Shanghae must not be abandoned; 
it is believed that a million and a half of people are living there, 
101 
that British Trade at that Port is very great, & . . . important British 
52 
interests must not be neglected," Troops at Shanghai also provided 
Gordon with an additional military safeguard, while the city was an 
53 important source of supply for his army. As fighting around Shanghai 
intensified, Brown provided Gordon with troops to serve temporarily 
beyond the thirty-mile radius. The British government approved his 
expedient, wishing to avoid permitting full-pay officers at Shanghai to 
enter the Chinese service. The Secretary for War, however, desired that 
Brown "afford every facility to officers who are willing to go on half 
54 
pay to join the force under Major Gordon." As it appeared expedient, 
the- British assumed greater responsibility in the war. They wished to 
assure the safety of the Ever-Victorious Army, which, together with, the 
British regular forces protected Shanghai. Reformation of the Chinese 
army, impeded by military decentralization and the financial problems 
of the Imperial government, did not serve the immediate interests of 
the British. An inconsistent policy toward reform was the result of 
British willingness to use expedients in subduing the rebellion. 
in 1864, continuing their earlier victories, the Imperial forces 
defeated the Taipings. Sino-British military cooperation hastened to 
an end. Circumstances which led to the disbanding of the Ever-Victori­
ous Army illustrated the incompatibility of Chinese and British modes 
of warfare. Beneath this difference in method lay an opposition of 
purpose. The British intervened to protect their trade. They consid­
ered regeneration of the Imperial government through military training 
a secondary goal. The Chinese defended a world-view—Confucianism—and 
a way of life which proved fundamentally opposed to the modernity the 
102 
British wished them tc adopt. The rebellion's aftermath, the abortive 
T'uxig-chih Restoration, conclusively demonstrated the incompatibility of 
Chinese -and British interests. 
In the few months that remained "before the fall of Nanking,- the 
rebels continued to fight for their lost cause. The Imperial forces 
launched a dual campaign, fighting in Chekiang .province while besieging 
Nanking. The capture cf Ch'ang-chou in May, 1864, was one of the 
Taipings' last struggles. "It was taken by assault after a desperate 
hand to hand fight which appears to have been continued in the streets 
of the city. ... It is not surprising that a. place of such importance 
. • . should have- been defended with & degree of desperation not 
<c 
ftitherto witnessed."' In June, Hung Hsiu-ch'uan died at Nanking. The 
following month, the city fell to the Imperial forces. Although 
remnants of -the Taipings joined other rebel bands, the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-
56 
kuo was destroyed. 
Throughout the last ca.mpa.igns, relations between Gordon and the 
Imperial commanders steadily deteriorated. After the recapture of 
Soochow in December, I863, several Taiping chiefs surrendered. With 
Gordon's sanction, Governor Li had promised them clemency. Li, however, 
revoked his promise and ordered the chiefs to be executed. Enraged, 
Gordon again threatened to resign. Through Robert Halt's mediation, 
Gordon agreed to retain his command and took part in the capture cf 
Ch'ang-~ehou. Subordinated to autonomous provincial commanders, Gordon 
held no authority. His terms of service prevented any long-term 
cooperation with provincial generals, who were jealous of their power, 
"vjhile licensed to serve the emperor, Gordon actually served the 
103 
provincial authorities. British policy was contradictory, as the 
Ever-Victorious Army undermined the centralisation they desired to 
foster. Angered "by Li!s conduct, and unable to halt the progress of 
military decentralization, the British withdrew their officers from the 
57 
emperor's service."' As a result of the usual delay in communication, 
Gordon remained in the Chinese service until June, when the troublesome 
Ever-Victorious Army was disbanded. Gordon's force operated within a 
limited area, largely around Shanghai. The army helped protect British 
interests at Shanghai, and from the English perspective, this limited 
intervention was both expedient and successful. As part of the broader 
program of reform, however, the Ever-Victorious Array was a gross 
failure- The British pragmatically chose a course of intervention best 
suited to their immediate interests, unintentionally abetting decentral­
ization. 
.After disbandiaent of the Ever-Victorious Army, the English coolly 
reassessed their interests in China. Bruce conferred with the official 
Wen-hsiang, to discuss their future policy. His suggestions and obser­
vations focused largely upon the safety of British interests. He 
"pointed out that their policy ought to be to render secure . . . /the/ 
great centres of trade and revenue, and have as few other strong 
58 
positions as possible."' Wen-hsiang desired to protect the port cities 
with Manchu forces, to avoid initiating Chinese in the use of foreign 
59 weapons and military techniques." He clearly wished to retain as much 
central authority as possible, a policy agreeable to Bruce. The author--
it3.es, Bruce observed, foresaw "difficulty in disposing of the 
provincial levies which have been called out to make head against the 
10'j-
insurrecticn and this apprehension of . , . these men turning against 
the Government , , „ confirms me in the opinion that, we have nothing to 
fear from any aggressive policy on the part of the Manchoo Govern-
60 
ment. " Bruce was aware that provincialism would weaken the dynastyj 
he suggested that, customs revenue and foreign inspectors be used to 
6l 
check local authorities. The Maritime Customs system and its agents 
would serve to unite the British and Chinese governments, simultane­
ously strengthening the dynasty and serving British interests. 
Bruce's desire to reform the Chinese military had considerably 
62 
weakened before the rebellion ended. Military decentralization 
intensified during the Taiping Rebellion, and Bruce correctly observed 
that the process would be exceedingly difficult to reverse. While he 
realized that provincial authorities wielded great military and 
63 
political power, he assumed, that, the central government eventually 
could restore its authority in the provinces. He shared Gordon's 
opinion that the Imperial troops "are no longer the inefficient Rabble 
64 
they used to be. . , ." His assessment was highly optimistic. The 
government's green-banner forces remained incompetent. Although the 
authorities attempted to consolidate the militia and the Imperial army, 
they failed. "Provincial armies and the regular green-banner troops 
existed side try side. All that the government accomplished was a 
blunting of the militia development, resulting in an increasing general 
65  
military weakness by the end. of the century." While provincial 
militarization initially weakened the central government after the 
rebellion, eventually China's entire military system lapsed into 
disarray, leading to unprecedented humiliation later in the century. 
105 
Brucecs program of reform could not reverse decentralization, nor could 
he halt the progress of the Ever-Victorious Army, although he disap­
proved of using British officers beyond the radius of Shanghai. British 
intervention was calculated to serve, and did. serve, British interests. 
The short-sightedness of British policy and obstacles to centralization 
negated the program of reform. 
As the Talping Rebellion drew to an end, the British renewed 
their interest In trade. The defeat of the rebel forces gratified the 
British desire for a restoration of commerce. Trade on the Yangtze 
Biver increased,^ and silk cultivation slowly revived. "The mulberry 
trees in the silk producing districts were left unpruned, the inhabi­
tants being afraid to resume their occupation. But as soon as Hang-chow-
foo was taken, they began to make their appearance, and the fields were 
filled with individuals pruning the trees. After reestablishment of 
Imperial authority; the British confidently expected a revival of the 
silk trade. The rebellion, however, mined China's silk export| Japan 
68 
and Italy gradually assumed control of the silk market. Wars, 
treaties, and intervention in the rebellion, all for the sake of trade, 
had created diplomatic ties between the Chinese a.nd English governments. 
Despite the rebellion's adverse effect upon trade, the British could 
not easily abandon their interests in China. 
"The objects of trading countries such as Great Britain . . . are 
not incompatible with the interests or dignity of China or her Govern-
6Q 
ment, , . ." ' Bruce's enthusiasm seemed appropriate in the aftermath 
of the Taiping Rebellion. While the Chinese had uniquely adapted to 
Western diplomacy, British officials were willing to respect Chinese 
106 
customs and. advocated a policy of reform and compromise. Despite the 
aura of cooperation between the Chinese and British governments, their 
interests fundamentally were opposed. During the Taiping Rebellion, 
the Chinese defended the Confucian way of life, and the British defended 
trade. The uneasy Sino-British alliance rested upon unification of 
incompatible oppc-sites, Confucianism and modernity. The Chinese 
secondarily assisted the British in protecting their trade interests, 
as the British cooperated with the Chinese to avert destruction of 
their society. Sino-British cooperation in the Taiping Rebellion 
proved a feeble link between two nations with divergent interests. The 
unity of Chinese and British interests was superficial and coincidental. 
The tenuous Sino-British alliance inaugurated during the Taiping 
Rebellion slowly dissolved, and finally vanished in the Boxer Rebellion. 
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CONCLUSION 
At mid-nineteenth century, Free Trade had assumed the guise of a 
universal panacea for international relations. In opening China to 
trade, the Victorians saw themselves conferring material and, social 
benefits upon the Chinese. Yet in forcing Westernization upon the 
Chinese, the Victorians failed to discern tneir own self-righteousness. 
Determined to bring China into the sphere of contemporary diplomatic 
and economic relations, the British dismissed China's historic tribute 
system as an anachronism. Through wars and treaties based upon Western 
principles of international relations, the British gradually brought 
the Imperial government into modernity. The British experience in 
China began as an economic venture, but the establishment of Free Trade 
entailed unforeseeable legal, diplomatic, and political problems. The 
Nanking and Tientsin treaties were provisional solutions to the problems 
of the China trade, which in turn created new difficulties as the 
English became dissatisfied with the Chinese response to Western 
principles of commerce. Sino-British treaties were only the initial 
step toward the modernization of China,, as the English gradually 
realized from their experience with the Imperial government, 
Through the circumstances which led to Chinese acceptance of the 
treaties, the Manchu and British governments slowly developed a policy 
of cooperation. The Taiping Rebellion strengthened the Sino-British 
alliance, Seen against the background of the. rebels' fanaticism and 
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destructiveness., the Manchus appeared, defenders of the stability that 
British economic interests depended upon. Although they long-professed 
neutrality, the British tacitly favored the Imperial cause, as they 
were "bound to the central government by the treaties. The Manchus1 
belated pro-foreignism and governmental reform, coupled with, the 
treaties, gave them a decisive advantage over the rebels in winning 
British support. The British therefore dismissed, the Taipings" pro-
foreignism and. Rung Jen-kan's reforms as empty gestures. The British 
intervened on the government's behalf when they were convinced that 
reform was hopeless among the Taipings and practicable for the Manchus. 
By serving the interests of a reformed administration, British prestige 
rexaain e& intac t. 
British intervention in the Taiping Rebellion exemplified 
"informal" imperialism. The British avoided assuming direct political 
control of China. They preferred to cooperate with indigenous author­
ities, evading the expense and difficulties of formal control. The 
Taiping Bebellion indicated the problems of a debilitated adminstration. 
As a result of the government * s weakness, the British were forced to 
assume unwanted political responsibility to safeguard, their commercial 
interests. In pursuit of economic enterprise, the British, encountered 
a series of local economic problems which increasingly required polit­
ical solutions. These temporary solutions to local problems conflicted 
with the long-range British policy of evading political responsibility. 
The British therefore attempted, to place the duty of governing back 
upon the Chinese. Their interests, however, compelled them to assume 
an advisory role in the process of regenerating the Imperial government. 
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While the British had no desire to incur governmental responsibility in 
China, they required political stability to ensure the security of their 
economic interests, which gradually drew them into involvement with 
upholding the sovereignty of the Manchu dynasty. The inconsistent, 
provisional character of informal imperialism in China demonstrated 
the pragmatism of mid-Victorian foreign policy. 
Prior to ratification of the Treaty of Tientsin, the British had 
favored the Imperial cause, yet their policy largely developed as an 
unplanned product of local and temporary circumstances. Upon achieving 
ratif.ica.tIon, the British hesitated to intervene; they did not follow 
a rigid plan of supporting the dynasty. Although their influence over 
the Imperial authorities became stronger as a result .of the rebellion, 
the British did not pursue a course designed to weaken the government 
l>y causing it to rely upon the foreign powers for assistance, British 
officials wished to take some part in China's government, and to keep 
it from becoming strong enough to resist foreign influence. Yet their 
foremost consideration remained the protection of Free Trade, which 
required a modicum of stability and strength for the Imperial govern­
ment, to prevent further disasters such as the Taiping Rebellion. The 
British program, of reform and limited intervention, although based upon 
protection of Free Trade, was meant to redound to the credit of the 
Imperial government. 
A eoiraaon interest in restoring the stability of China united 
British, and Chinese authorities. To reestablish their sovereignty, the 
Manchus had to reassert Confucianism, the conservative ideology of 
Chinese society. Yet -Confucianism proved incompatible with the program 
114 
o£ gradual modernization which the British advocated to maintain their 
trade interests. The opposition of the dynasty's political interests 
and British economic interests "became increasingly evident throughout 
the nineteenth century, and culminated in Chins.5 s humiliation under the 
Boxer Protocol, 
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